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ABSTRACT
This research attempts to develop and empirically test 
an Integrative model of business economic performance. The 
research framework includes certain concepts and relation­
ships that emanate from the literature in Industrial Organ­
ization Economics, Business Policy, and Organization Theory.
In general, the key tenet of the study is threefold: 
a) that there are industry differences in types of chal­
lenges confronting top level management; b) that strategic 
and organizational responses that different environmental 
challenges elicit are quite different and somewhat predict­
able; and c) that the combination of the environmental, 
strategic, and organizational characteristics of the organ­
izations affect their economic performance.
The sample for this research was selected from the 
less-diversified manufacturing companies on COMPUSTAT tapes. 
The sample proved to be quite diverse, representing a broad 
cross section of different manufacturing industries.
The analysis of the data, in general, supported the 
major contentions of the study. The results suggested that 
organizations' responses to external contingencies vary by 
industry characteristics. In addition, it was concluded 
that the environmental, strategic, and structural profile of 





The purpose of the first chapter is twofold. First, 
the research problem that is dealt with in the dissertation 
is stated and the research model presented. Secondly, the 
importance of this research is justified in light of the 
shortcomings in previous writings and research on the 
subject.
I. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM:
The question of what determines the level of 
performance achieved by companies still defies a sure 
answer. The problem is extremely complex due to the fact 
that a vast number of interwoven influences, both internal 
and external to organizations, are at work. Given the 
complexity of the problem, it is not surprising that there 
exist many independent theoretical frameworks that have 
.attempted to explain business performance (Theorelli, 1977a; 
Bourgeois and Astley, 1978; Bourgeois and Astley, 1979; 
Caves, 1980; Lenz, 1980; White and Hamermesh, 1981). Yet, 
few of these have been used in their entirety to guide 
investigations. "Instead, research has generally proceeded 
under the direction of more restricted formulation
1
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associated with specific research traditions." (Lenz, 
1980:2). These often independent research traditions, as 
White and Hamermesh (1981) suggest, use different and 
usually singular explanatory factors, have different 
conceptual schemes, employ different languages, examine 
different organization units, and serve different objectives.
Industrial organization (10) economists, for example, 
seek to identify sets of market and industry attributes that 
influence economic performance and to build theories 
detailing the nature of the links between those attributes 
and end performance (Caves, 1967? Boyle, 1972; Scherer,
1980). As a result, they have developed models of 
competitive and monopolistic industrial behavior. These 
models suggest that given the limiting structural conditions 
of these two market forms, it is possible to predict with 
considerable accuracy the resulted performance of firms in 
response to basic changes in industry supply and demand. 
Findings of 10 line of research are often used in formulation 
of public policy.
Industrial market structure in 10 literature is 
typically assessed with objective summary measures that are 
intended to capture the overall configuration of a 
competitive setting (e.g., sales concentration ratios, rate 
of growth in demand, advertising-to-sales ratio). No
explicit role is assumed for the managerial perceptions of 
the industry attributes in the industry structure-conduct- 
performance framework. The 10 paradigm also fails to 
recognize that how a firm organizes and administers its 
activities can too affect its performance. Investigations 
of these factors have largely been the province of another 
theoretical orientation, organization theory (OT).
The predominant line of thought in this area (i.e., OT) 
has come to be known as contingency theory. It takes the 
view that organizations are responsive to their environment 
and that performance is contingent upon the goodness of fit 
between environment and internal structure of organizations 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). In 
this context, structure is usually conceptualized and 
operationalized along bureaucratic dimensions of 
differentiation, centralization, formalization, etc.
Contrary to 10 researchers, most students of 
organization theory rely exclusively on managerial 
perceptions in measuring environmental characteristics.
They base this practice on the arguments presented by Weick 
(1969) and Child (1972) that organizations respond not to the 
actual environment but rather to the environment that is 
perceived by managers. In other words, it is only through 
managerial perception that environment becomes meaningful
4
for decision makers. As such, objective reality of physical 
environment is less than important in determining or 
influencing the way organizations are designed or managed 
(Miles, Snow, and Pfeffer, 1974; Anderson and Paine, 1975; 
Hambrick and Snow, 1977). In addition to the 
operationalization of environment, the way this construct is 
conceptualized is also different across the 10 and OT 
disciplines. Where intensity of competition, barriers to 
entry, product differentiation, and so forth, characterize 
environment in Industrial Organization, the dimensions of 
environment that have captured the attention of organization 
theorists are for the most part consistent with those used in 
cybernetics (Ashby, 1957). These dimensions center on 
environmental uncertainty and complexity. Surprisingly, even 
in a few OT studies that concepts of environment common to 
those of 10 are used, perceptual measures or heuristic 
procedures are employed to tap the variables (Negandhi and 
Reimann, 1972; Khandwalla, 1973; Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973; 
Simonetti and Boseman, 1975; Hrebiniak and Snow, 1980).
The models of performance developed by organization 
theorists are generally deterministic. They take a reactive 
stance by viewing the environment and other "contextual" 
factors as imperative forces to which organizations respond
5
(Child, 1972; Bobbitt and Ford, 1980). That is, an 
organization finds itself in a particular set of 
circumstances. It adapts and survives, or it fails, what 
this view often does not explicitly consider is that 
organizations are purposive entities and management is a 
creative and proactive process. Depending on environmental 
and internal properties, they not only have considerable 
leeway in making choices to meet contingencies, but also have 
the capability of influencing the environment.
Business policy's (BP) approach to studying of 
performance fills this gap by viewing management as a 
proactive or opportunistic agent and focusing much of the 
research on the strategy variable (Mintzberg, 1972). In the 
Business Policy framework, strategic decision making is seen 
as the heart of organization-environment co-alignment process 
and as the key administrative activity through which 
organization leaders establish organizational goals, define 
its domains of action, and determine how it will navigate and 
compete within the chosen domains. Accordingly, one of the 
major streams of research in the area of strategic 
management, known as the content approach, centers on the 
makeup of firms' strategic postures, and various conditions 
under which they have been adopted or proven successful 
(e.g., Hofer, 1973; Glueck, 1976; Khandwalla, 1976; Paine
and Anderson, 1977; Hatton, et al., 1978; Schendel and 
Patton, 1978; Jauch, Osborn and Glueck, 1980). It is 
interesting to note that, although the essence of formulating 
competitive strategy is relating a company to its environment 
and a key aspect of the firm's environment is the industry in 
which it competes, during much of the development of the 
field Industrial Organization made no impact on Business 
Policy's concept of strategy. Porter (1979a) suggests that 
this reflects some real underlying differences in the 
purpose, frame of reference, unit of analysis and research 
values that each field has traditionally embraced. Within 
the last ten years, however, the promises of 10 is being 
recognized by strategic management writers and researchers 
(Hofer, 1973; Hatton, et al., 1978; Hofer and Schendel, 1978; 
Schendel and Patton, 1978; Caves, et al., 1980; Porter,
1980).
With respect to OT research, the BP literature has paid 
occasional attention to strategy implementatidn, with a 
focus on the design of the administrative structure. Such 
works are based on the idea that strategy guides the choice 
of structure (Chandler, 1962; Pouraker and Stopford, 1968; 
Rumelt, 1974; Galbraith and Nathanson, 1978). However, the 
measures of structure used in these studies are largely 
limited to the distinction between functional and multi­
7
divisional forms, which give a summary configuration of 
organization structure. Very little research has been done 
on the relationship of strategy and internal bureaucratic 
structural features and processes that are of great interest 
to OT scholars. Also, most of such BP studies have not 
considered performance in their models, and when they have, 
results have been less than conclusive (Rumelt, 1974).
The brief overview of the directions of research in the 
fields of 10, OT, and BP certainly indicates that there is a 
clear need and considerable opportunity for cross­
fertilization, with the subsequent widening of research 
boundaries across these disciplinary areas. The proposed
i
research in this dissertation is intended to fill some of the 
gap among these fields by developing and putting to empirical 
testing an interdisciplinary model of firms' economic 
performance (Figure 1-1). The major feature of this 
integrative model is that it connects, in a single framework, 
the concepts of industry attractiveness and structure, 
perceived intensity and nature of competition, strategic 
responses to environmental demands, organization structure, 
and level of business performance.
In general, the primary contention of this proposal is 
threefold:
(a) that there are industry differences in types of
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challenges and uncertainties confronting top level 
managements;
(b) that responses that these challenges elicit, in 
terms of strategic actions and internal structural patterns, 
vary by industry types; and
(c) these strategic and structural responses affect 
firm profitability, as do industry profitability differences 
(Beard and Dess, 19 79).
II. JUSTIFICATION:
From the above summary of the research in 10, OT, and 
BP, it is evident that these fields have adopted rather 
independent approaches. This, though not without value, has 
often encouraged a certain fragmentation in the resulting 
theories that makes it difficult to detect the cumulative 
implications of research findings of these various 
disciplines. The position presented in this paper is that 
industrial organization, organization theory, and business 
policy have gone their separate ways for too long. Although 
different in perspectives, these areas have overlapping and 
sometimes indentical explanatory variables. They have a 
great deal in common and should be exchanging theoretical 
frameworks and expanding their research boundaries. One 
benefit growing out of such a broad approach is that it
10
would relate and put into perspective a diverse array of 
research virtually all of which bears upon business 
performance. This would be a matter of significant 
importance to academicians and practitioners alike. An 
essential step toward that end, however, is to develop 
models that synthesize and relate together relevant concepts 
from these areas in a meaningful manner {Preston, 1977; 
Thorelli, 1977b; Caves, 1980; Miles and Snow, 1981;
Hamermesh and White, 1981). The proposed study is indeed an 
attempt in that direction. It presents and empirically 
tests an interdisciplinary model of a firm's economic 
performance.
Fairly rich theory and a considerable body of empirical 
data already independently link the factors of this model. 
However, the strong links and overlaps between the 
independent variables used by different schools of thought 
have gone largely unstated. Though researchers in each of 
these fields are already beginning to integrate their 
efforts, all of the empirical work along this line 
concentrates on only two of the three identified areas 
(e.g., Khandwalla, 1973; Miles and Snow, 1978; Steer and 
Cable, 1978; Grinyer, et al., 1980; Hrebiniak and Snow, 1980, 
Miller and Friesen, 1980; Jemison, 1981). Efforts to tie 
together models of all three disciplines (see Figures 1-2 and 













Figure 1-2. Synthetic Framework for Organization-Environment Analysis 
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Figure 1.3. Structure-Strategy-Performance Ecosystem 
Source: Thorelli, Hans B. (1977:10)
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calling for such empirically integrative works (Preston, 
1977; Thorelli, 1977b; Bourgeois, 1980; Lenz, 1980; Porter, 
1980; Hamermesh and White, 1981; Miles and Snow, 1981). The 
study proposed here is a response to those calls and an 
effort to fill the existing gaps and deficiencies. It 
incorporates the 10 concept of industry structure into 
management's strategy— structure— performance paradigm, 
recognizing that industry is the fundamental arena in which 
organization behavior occurs. That is, there are 
distinguishing characteristics of industries that affect the 
type of external issues or problems salient to top 
management and the strategic options chosen to deal with 
them. This position is consistent with Steiner's (1969) 
findings in a survey of 259 corporate executives. He 
reports that there is a wide variation in importance 
attributed to strategic factors among groups of companies 
operating in different industries. The position is also 
supported by industry case studies. For example, Business 
Week (1979) suggests that the home appliance industry is 
becoming the exclusive province of companies that compete 
only on a high-volume, low-cost basis. On the other hand, 
the tobacco industry is reported to be characterized by a 
much broader range of strategic behaviors, with companies 
"competing on a manufacturing, marketing, or product
14
development basis" (reported in Miles and Snow, 1981:550).
Therefore, industry structure seems to be a variable 
that circumscribes organizations in ways that are both 
theoretically and practically meaningful and worthwhile to 
investigate. As Miles and Snow (1981) point out, industry 
structure is a proxy for a number of important 
characteristics of a firm's environment, such as required 
capital investment, degree of product differentiation, types 
of production technology, expected long-term profit 
prospects, and so forth. These are the types of 
environmental factors that determine the intensity and nature 
of competition in an industry and affect managerial decision 
making (Caves, 1967; Boyle, 1972; Porter, 1980; Scherer,
1980).
Secondly, "industry is an environmental context that is 
rooted in reality. Unlike other environmental dimensions 
presumed to affect organizational behavior, such as 
uncertainty, munificence, or hostility, industry structure 
factors are concrete and frequently externally verifiable" 
(Miles and Snow, 1981:549). Some writers have already 
warned us that "...measures based solely on subjective data 
provide information about the subject not about his 
environment" (Starbuck, 1976:1087). And that "...an 
exclusive reliance on perceived environment relegates the 
researchers to the study of a psychological state of
15
uncertainty per se rather than extra-organizational 
phenomena, and thereby negates the very concept of external 
environment" (Bourgeois, 1980:35).
Finally, the scientific validity of some of the most 
commonly used perceived-uncertainty scales is doubtful.
Tosi, Aldag and Storey (1973) suggest that Lawrence and 
Lorsch's environmental measure is methodo- logically 
inadequate. This conclusion is reached based on the 
assessment of the internal reliablity of the measurement 
instrument and based on how it compares to other measures of 
environmental volatility. Downey, et al., (1975) also report 
that there appears to be a lack of communality between 
Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) and Duncan's (1972) scales which 
are presumably designed to measure the same concept. As a 
result, they contend that "uncertainty concepts presently 
used in organization theory involve much ambiguity. The 
findings...should serve to put the researcher on guard 
against at least some potential pitfalls invclved in current 
uncertainty conceptualizations and their applications" 
(Downey, Hellriegel and Slocum, 1975:628).
There also seems to exist a confusion with respect to 
the concept of competition in the management literature. In 
modern economic theory an industry is said to be competitive 
(or more precisely, purely competitive) when the number of
16
firms selling a homogeneous commodity is so large, and each 
firm's share of the market is so small, that no single firm 
is able to influence appreciably the commodity's price by 
varying the quantity of output it sells. This technical 
definition of competition that emphasizes market structure 
is drastically different from the usage adopted by business 
people and some management writers who emphasize the behavior 
and conduct of sellers and buyers. In this latter 
conception, competition is perceived as a conscious striving 
of business firms against one another for patronage 
(Scherer, 1980:Ch. 2). Scherer uses the term "rivalry" to 
characterize such activity that business people and some 
management writers refer to as "competition." He contends 
that "essence of rivalry is striving for potentially 
incompatible positions combined with a clear awareness by 
the parties involved that positions they seek to attain may 
be incompatible" (Scherer, 1980:10). CJnder this dichotomy, 
as Scherer suggests, it is possible for there to be vigorous 
rivalry where there is a low degree of competition (e.g., 
automobile industry). At the same time, there can be pure 
competition without any rivalry (e.g., grain industry). In 
the present study such distinction is recognized by 
objective measurement of the structural attributes of the
17
industries reflecting the economic conception of the 
competition. And at the same time, perceived measures of 
intensity and nature of rivalry (i.e., price competition, 
promotional competition, product competition, etc.) are 
included to take account of the behavioral aspects of 
competition. Therefore, adoption of simplified and 
undimensional concepts of competition and rivalry, as done by 
some management researchers (Negandhi and Prasad, 1971; 
Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973), is avoided. In addition, 
reliance on multiple sources of information, as in this 
research, not only will help alleviate some of the above- 
mentioned theoretical and methodological problems, but will 
also present the chance to assess the explanatory role of 
perceptual environmental constructs vis-a-vis their objective 
counterparts. Finally, if management theory and research is 
to become more comparative and parsimonious, useful will be 
studies across industries, where the strengths and
limitations of environmental and strategic concepts and
measures would be most apparent.
In short, it is hoped that results of this work will
serve to validate the utility of synthesizing from diverse 
conceptual schemes and lay the cornerstones for programs of 
future research.
CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OP LITERATURE 
In this chapter, the literature relevant to this 
research is reviewed and research propositions are derived.
To facilitate an orderly review of the related literature, as 
well as an organized approach to derivation of propositions, 
this chapter is arranged around sets of constructs and 
linkages used in the literature. This approach results in 
the identification of the following three groups of 
relationships:
I. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE-STRATEGY-PERFORMANCE:
Studying this chain of relationships has been 
predominantly the province of students of 10. The essence of 
the 10 paradigm is that a firm's performance in the 
marketplace depends critically on the characteristics of the 
industry environment in which it competes. This is expressed 
in the familiar industry structure-conduct- performance 
trilogy (See Figure 2-1). Bain (1968:2) has defined market 
structure as "those characteristics of the organization of a 
market that seem to exercise a strategic influence on the 
nature of competition and pricing." A number of 
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Figure 2-1. A Model of Industrial Organizational 
Analysis
Source: Scherer, P.M. (1980:4)
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strategic influence: degree of seller concentration, degree
of product differentiation, barriers of entry (of new 
sellers to the market), and growth in demand are among the 
most important ones.
Concentration is a proxy for the number and size, 
distribution of the firms in an industry. It is the 
cumulative market share of the few largest firms in the 
industry. Barriers to entry are indicative of the 
difficulty that new entrants will face in order to enter the 
industry. Product differentiation is primarily a 
function of the degree of product substitutability among 
competing firms' products. Industry products are 
differentiated when for some real or imagined reason, one 
firm's products are preferred by at least some buyers over 
rival products at a given price. The structure of a purely 
competitive market, for example, is characterized by product 
homogeneity (lack of product differentiation), many sellers, 
each holding a small share of the market (low seller 
concentration), and freedom of entry (lack of barriers to 
entry). In such an environment, the individual firm has no 
concern for "spoiling the market" (Vernon, 1972) or causing 
prices to fall. So long as the price exceeds the marginal 
cost, it will be profitable to increase level of output and 
sales. So, firms' competitive conduct will revolve mainly
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around competitive pricing and cost efficiency.
Almarin Philips (1962), an economist skillful in 
behavioral sciences, argues that as the number of firms in 
an industry increases and the share of the industry output 
supplied by each firm decreases, it will be increasingly 
more difficult for individual sellers to anticipate (and pay 
attention to) the effect of their price and output decisions 
on rival actions and overall level of prices. Such 
conditions will also hamper the chances of any coordinative 
and collusive efforts among the rivals. Furthermore, the 
more numerous the rivals, the greater will be the probability 
that at least one becomes a maverick, pursuing an independent 
aggressive pricing policy. Such a maverick can make it hard 
for others to hold prices high.
On the other hand, according to the oligopoly theory, 
when rivalry is among a few, the firms can recognize, to 
some extent, the impact of their competitive moves on their 
rivals, and fear retaliation or efforts to counter the 
moves. That is to say that the firms are mutually 
interdependent. As such, some forms of rivalry, noticeably 
price competition, are highly unstable and quite possibly 
will leave the entire industry worse off from the standpoint 
of profitability. Under such conditions, it is quite likely 
that the firms will be able to collude (tacitly or
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otherwise) to raise prices above long-term average costs 
(Scherer, 1980; Caves, 1972).
When barriers to entry are low or non-existent, super 
normal profits cannot, in the long run, exist. Because even 
if high profits exist in the short run, new firms attracted 
by the profit will come into the market, bringing with them 
new production capacity and a desire to gain market share.
As a result, industry output will increase, shifting the 
supply curve to the right. This process will continue until 
the price is lowered to the level of average total cost for 
the representative firms. With presence of higher barriers 
to entry, however, price of the industry's product can exceed 
the average total cost for each firm, generating above-normal 
profits (Scherer, 1980; Caves, 1972). The mechanism through 
which entry barriers (scale economies in particular) can 
deter potential entrants from entering an industry is 
demonstrated by Vernon (1972) in a simple illustration. 
Consider the average cost curve of a typical firm in industry 
A, as shown in Figure 2-2.
To achieve minimum average cost, a firm entering 
industry A must produce an output of a least OB... 
Suppose that total output of industry A is OT, and OB
is about one third of OT. If there are two firms
already in the industry, then they must be willing to
reduce their market share significantly to permit the
entrant to attain minimum efficient scale. For
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example, if each had 50 percent before entry, they would 
be cut to 33 percent after entry. The potential entrant 
would clearly recognize that the two existing firms 
would not be willing to allow this to happen without a 
struggle (for example, price and advertising warfare). 
The recognition of this possibility should serve to 
discount attractiveness of entry to industry A at 
minimum efficient scale.
Of course, the entrant could enter at a smaller 
scale, say, output OA in the figure. However, at 
output OA the entrant's unit cost would be higher than 
the cost of established firms (that is, OC compared 












Figure 2-2. Scale Economy Barriers
Source: Vernon, John M. (1972:78)
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Product differentiation means that established firms 
have brand identification and customer loyalties due to their 
past and present advertising, product design, servicing, 
distribution, or simply to their being first into the 
industry. It tends to reduce the price sensitivity 
(elasticity) of demand for the products by creating buyer 
preferences. Buyer preference and lower price elasticity of 
demand in turn enable firms to raise their profit margins. 
Product differentiation via advertising is more likely to 
occur in consumer goods than in producer goods industries 
because buyers are relatively uninformed about the relative 
merits of the existing products. In such industries, the new 
entrants will have to sell at a price below the established 
brands to overcome existing customer loyalties. This will be 
a deterrent to entry for prospective entrants (Wilson and 
Camanor, 1967).
The foregoing structural characteristics and their 
consequences can be well exemplified by the breakfast cereal 
industry. In 1972, the Federal Trade Commission charged the 
major companies in this industry with practicing a shared 
monopoly (Business Week, 1978). The charge was that the "Big 
Four" of this industry (namely, Kellogg, General Mills, 
General Foods, and Quaker Oats) do not compete on a price 
basis, enjoy monopoly level profits, and make it tough for
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other firms to enter this industry because of their large 
advertising budgets and their grip on shelf space through 
their brand proliferation.
Growth of industry, in terms of sales, is also a 
determining factor with respect to the conduct and 
profitability of the firms in an industry. First, 
opportunities for earning higher profits are simply more 
readily available in growing industries. Secondly, as 
Porter (1980:18) suggests, "slow industry growth turns 
competition into a market share game for firms seeking 
expansion. Market share competition is a great deal more 
volatile than is the situation in which rapid industry 
growth insures that firms can improve results just by 
keeping up with the industry...." Thirdly, even "in 
oligopolistic industries where fixed costs are relatively 
high, slow growth or decline in demand may cause the 
breakdown of collusive, joint-profit-maximization pricing 
behavior, thus leading to lower price-cost margins" 
(Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, 1974:64). For all of the foregoing 
reasons, firms in industries facing rapid growth are less 
likely to feel competitive pressures than those in 
industries characterized by slow growth or stagnation, and 
thereby accrue temporary windfall profits. However, Caves 
(1972:30-31) offers a different line of argument. He
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contends that in oligopolistic industries, rapid growth of 
demand is likely to induce firms to behave highly 
competitively. Given such a demand pattern, price cutting, 
even if it leads to lower current profits, would be an 
attractive strategy for increasing market share and can 
ultimately lead to greater profits in the future. In 
stagnating or declining industries, however, any attempt by 
a firm to increase its market share will be likely to result 
in lower profits for the entire industry. Therefore, the 
pricing behavior of firms should be less competitive in the 
latter case.
In the 10 literature, the discussion of the firm's 
conduct in different types of industries, as represented 
above, is by and large limited to theoretical explanations. 
The empirical work instead has focused mostly on the direct 
relationship of industry structure and economic performance 
at the industry level {e.g., Weiss, 1963; Comanor and Wilson, 
1967; Holtermann, 1973; Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, 1974; Orr,
1974), and some at the firm level (e.g., FTC, 1969; Vernon 
and Nourse, 1973; Bass et al., 1977). These studies in 
general show a positive correlation between the above- 
mentioned structural attributes and profitability.
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PROPOSITION 1-1.
The higher the concentration, product 
differentiation, entry barriers, and industry growth, 
the higher will be the profitability of the industry 
and the firms operating in it.
PROPOSITION 1-2.
Higher concentration, production differentiation, 
and barriers to entry are associated with perceived 
product and marketing rivalry (non-price) in the 
industry, and tend to accentuate the strategic 
importance of non-price components of the strategic 
make up of the competing firms.
PROPOSITION 1-3.
Firms in faster-growing industries are faced with 
less intense rivalry than firms in slower growth 
industries.
PROPOSITION 1-4.
There is a positive correlation between industry 
profitability and firm profitability.
Management researchers have also occasionally shown 
interest in inter-firm differences due to inter-industry 
variations. Harrigan (1980) in her study of strategies for 
declining industries pointed out to industry structure as an 
important factor influcening firms* relative success. Beard
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and Dess (1979) have recently found a positive and 
significant relationship between industry profitability and 
profitability of firms belonging to those industries.
Studies coming out of the well-known PIMS research program 
report that fixed capital intensity is very unprofitable in 
unconcentrated industries, or that a comparative product 
quality is more profitable when market growth is medium to 
high (Schoeffler, et al., 1974; Buzzell, et al., 1975; 
Schoeffler, 1977). Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) noted and 
specified the dominant environmental demands as product and 
technical development in plastics, product development and 
market research in consumer foods, and customer services and 
product quality in standardized container industries. Hofer 
(1973) in the study of the case descriptions provided by 
Fortune found, among other things, that the relative success 
of different possible strategic responses differs for 
different types of strategic challenges. "For example, 
increasing penetration of existing products for existing 
markets seems to succeed more often as a response to major 
changes in technology. By the same token, the development of 
new products for existing markets appears to be more 
successful as a response to major changes in technology than 
is horizontal diversification." (Hofer, 1973:51).
Other researchers have similarly found that the range
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and nature of strategic options to cope with competition are 
different across industries (e.g., Steiner, 1969).
Khandwalla (1976) in his study of seventy-nine American 
manufacturing firms came to the conclusion that firms 
operating in environments threatened by product competition 
and technological change are likely to have more 
multi-faceted strategies. For example, they tend to put 
greater emphasis on product development and marketing (in 
comparison with firms in an environmental characterized by 
price competition). This is also confirmed by Jauch, et al. 
(1980), who write: "Apparently the environmental challenge
requiring the most variety in strategic action is change in 
technology." Khandwalla (1976) offers a rationale for such a 
finding by suggesting that competition and technological 
change imply uncertainty and environmental complexity. And 
that "the general effect of a dynamic, complex, uncertain 
environment is to raise the importance of a larger number of 
strategic-type activites. A complex environment apparently 
begets a complex and comprehensive corporate strategy" 
(Khandwalla, 1976: 69).
PROPOSITION 1-5.
The strategic postures assumed by a company 
reflect its top management's perception of the 
intensity and nature of rivalry in its industry.
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PROPOSITION 1-6.
The more intense the perceived overall rivalry in 
the industry, the greater will be the strategic 
complexity of the firms in the industry.
Lieberson and O'Connor (1972) have attempted to explain 
the variance of corporate performance through environmental, 
corporate, and leadership influences, for 167 companies in 
thirteen different industries. The portion of the 
profitability variance accounted for.by industry variables, 
corporate variables and leadership were 29 percent, 23 
percent and 15 percent respectively. In a similar study of 
193 manufacturing corporations over a 19-year period, 
however, the researchers found that their stewardship 
(leadership) variable was the most powerful in explaining 
corporate profitability. Their three environmental 
variables - GNP, industry sales, and concentration, however, 
had fairly low explanatory power. They attributed this 
result, partially, to the larger size and diversity of the 
corporations in their sample (Weiner and Mahoney, 1981),
PROPOSITION 1-7.
Combination of environmental and strategic 
variables associated with high performance firms is 
significantly different from that of low performance 
firms.
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Where all of the above-reviewed studies have used data 
from firms in different industries, a few studies have 
concentrated on companies in a single industry. Of the most 
prominant among them are studies by Hatton, et al. (1978) and 
Schendel and Patton (1978) on strategies of groups of firms 
in the brewing industry and their effects on profitability. 
They have developed quantitative models of business strategy 
for the firms' objectives, strategies and environments.
Lenz's (1980) research of savings and loan associations is 
another single-industry study. He has found that high 
performance saving and loan firms belong to environments 
characterized by lower levels of social economic 
development, obtain higher prices for their services and 
seem to have flatter organizational hierarchies.
Competitive strategy in the U.S. TV industry has been 
studied by Datta (1979). He suggests that quality is the 
most important factor of success in this industry.
With respect to single-industry studies, although not 
without benefit, these studies may not permit the 
development of generic hypotheses that will result in a 
"contingency theory of business strategy" (Hofer, 1975). In 
any case, it seems that different market industry 
environments provide to companies hosts of competitive 
challenges and response possibilities that are different in
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scope and complexity. And the nature of the match between 
challenges and responses to them have an impact on the 
economic performance of the firms.
II. ENVIRONMENT-ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE-PERFORMANCE:
In their search for the components of a general theory 
of organization structure, several theorists have been 
impressed with explanatory potential of the environment in 
which the organization is located. These theorists argue 
that unlike physical objects, and like any other living 
entities, organizations survive by constantly engaging in an 
input-transformation-output process (Emery and Trust, 19 65; 
Katz and Kahn, 1966). The organization-environment, 
exchanges, however, dictate the dependence of the 
organization on its external environment. Dependency poses 
certain "constraints" and "contingencies" which interfere 
with attainment of organization rationality and, therefore, 
threaten the survival of the organization (Thompson, 1967). 
Studies of such environmental impacts have made some 
theorists conclude that environment is in fact "imperative" 
to organizations (see Jackson and Morgan, 1978). These 
studies indicate that the more variable and unpredictable 
the environment, the more the prevailing structure would be 
flexible and adaptive with coordinating techniques more
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elaborate and based increasingly on mutual adjustment (Dill, 
1953; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Morse and Lorsch, 1970; and Duncan, 1972). Studies also show 
that complex and heterogeneous environments are likely to 
require more highly differentiated organizational structures 
than are simple and homogeneous environments (Dill, 1958; 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Duncan, 1972).
The explanation for these results can follow from 
Ashby's (1957) law of requisite variety; greater disparity in 
factors external to an organism should be matched with 
greater variability of factors internal to that organism. As 
Weick puts it, it takes equivocality to deal with 
equivocality (Wick, 1969). Organisms that follow this law of 
requisite variety are expected to have a higher survival 
potential.
Some writers and researchers have taken issue with the 
use of perceived uncertainty concept as used in OT 
literature. Several studies have shown that objective 
environmental uncertainty and the uncertainty perceived by 
managers are not the same things (Tosi et al., 1973; Downey, 
Hellriegel, and Solcum, 1975). Others have examined whether 
perceptions of environmental uncertainty are more 
characteristic of the environment or of the perceiver 
(Downey and Slocum, 1975). There are even those who
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question the direction of causality of the perceived 
uncertainty-organization structure relationship. They argue 
that it may be the degree of differentiation and uncertainty 
in the organization structure that conditions the extent to 
which environment is perceived to be dynamic and complex 
(Huber, et al., 1975).
While uncertainty has been the primary dimension of the 
environment examined in OT research, Aldrich (1979) offers 
the degree of interconnectedness of the system of
organizations as being an important variable. Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978: Ch. 4)* on the other hand, argue that the 
important dimensions of the environment are the degree of 
concentration of resources, and the degree of inter­
connectedness of the organizations. Pfeffer suggests that:
They view uncertainty as the result of 
relationships among social actors, which in turn were 
governed by the conditions of the environment in which 
these actors operated. One implication of this argument 
is that uncertainty may be too global a concept to use 
in explaining structure, and that the more fundamental 
dimensions of either the environment itself or else 
relationship among the social actors should be used as 
the independent variables. (Peffer, 1981:87).
Occasionally studies have dealt with the market 
processes surrounding organizations and their influence on 
organizational structure. Conceptualization of these market
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processes often emphasizes competitive conduct {i.e., 
rivalry) rather than structural dimensions of the 
environment, even though the term competition is used (see 
Scherer, 1980:Ch. 2). Khandwalla (1973), for instance, has 
studied effects of intensity and type of "competition" (i.e., 
rivalry) on the structure of organizations. He concludes 
that "competition" in general tends to lead to 
decentralization of authority, use of sophisticated 
management controls, and greater selectivity in implementing 
both. His data also suggest that while price competition 
has little impact on the firm's top management authority and 
control structure, marketing competition seems to be 
positively related to both. Furthermore, product 
competition requires a high order of flexibility and 
creativity, a high degree of internal control and 
coordination, and a high level of selectivity in delegating 
and controlling. Broadly similar results have emerged from 
Simonetti and Boseman's (1975) study of Mexican and Italian 
firms. They concluded that firms in highly "competitive 
markets" will be more effective if they employ more 
decentralization of decision making, whereas this structural 
feature is unrelated to the effectiveness of firms in non­
competitive markets. Peffer and Leblebici (1973), on the 
other hand, hypothesized that a competitive environment
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requires tighter coordination and more orderly use of the 
firm's resources. Thus, a competitive firm should choose 
less horizontal differentiation and more hierarchical layers 
of supervisors. It should require more frequent reporting, 
specify decision-making procedures more fully in advance, 
and depend more on oral communication. For a sample of 
manufacturing firms, they found competition (measured from 
the chief executives' perception) indeed to be positively 
correlated with formalization, proportion of oral 
communication, and review of performance.
PROPOSITION II-1.
The higher the perceived intensity of overall 
rivalry in the industry, the higher the organizational 
decentralization, autonomy, and C.E.O.'s delegation of 
authority.
Dubick's (1978) analysis of competition and 
organization structure on 72 newspapers is the only study of 
this nature that uses one of industrial economics' objective 
measures of competition (i.e., 2-firm concentration ratio). 
Differentiation of organization structures is shown to be 
positively related to this variable.
One of the most recent studies of differences in 
organizational characteristics due to inter-industry
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variations is probably that of Hrebiniak and Snow's (1980). 
They argue that there may be "objective" characteristics of 
industries that affect the perception of managers regarding 
the type of uncertainty and appropriate response to it. 
Interestingly enough, however, they did not use objective 
criteria in collecting their data; they relied on expert 
judgment. Nevertheless, they found that perceptions of 
environmental uncertainty, intraorganizational influence, and 
degree of structural decentralization vary by industry. As a 
result, they suggested that "organizational researchers 
increasingly should incorporate industry effects into their 
efforts at theory development and empirical research" 
(Hrebiniak and Snow, 1980:758). The results of this study 
with regards to the relationship of inter-industry variations 
with intraorganizational distribution of influence is 
defensible in light of the "strategic contengencies’ theory 
of intraorganizational power" (Hickson et al., 1971). 
According to this theory, the relative power of an 
organizational unit is, at least partially, a function of the 
extent to which that unit controls and copes with the 
critical strategic contingencies facing the organization 
(Hickson, et al., 1971; Jemison, 1981; Pfeffer, 1981).
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PROPOSITION II-2.
The higher the industry product differentiation is, 
and the more rivalry is perceived to be marketing 
related, the more the internal power balance in the 
organization is likely to shift to marketing oriented 
units.
PROPOSITION II-3.
The more rivalry is perceived to be product 
related, the more the internal balance in the 
organization is likely to shift to technocratic and 
management science-oriented units.
PROPOSITION II-4.
The more rivalry is perceived to be price related, 
the more the internal power balance is likely to shift 
to production and financial units.
PROPOSITION I1-5.
The greater the rate of innovations with respect 
to products and processes in the industry, the more the 
internal power balance is likely to shift to the R&D 
unit.
PROPOSITION II-6.
Combination of external industry characteristics 
and internal organization characteristics of high 
performance firms is significantly different from that 
of low performance firms.
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III. STRATEGY-STRUCTURE-PERFORMANCE:
It was just stated, in the previous section of this 
chapter, that power accrues to organizational units that 
cope with the critical strategic contingencies facing the 
organization. It was also assumed that these critical 
contingencies have their roots in the external environment 
of the organization'. However, according to Hambrick ( 1980), 
both environment and strategy account for the critical 
contingencies that organizations have to deal with. As such, 
the organizational influence patterns are related to both 
environmental and strategic factors. This position is not 
only hypothesized, but also supported, by Hambrick (1980).
PROPOSITION III-1.
The more financial factors are emphasized in the 
organization strategy, the more mechanistically the 
organization will be structured and the production and 
financial units will have more influence with regards to 
strategic decisions.
PROPOSITION III-2.
The more emphasis on product development and R&D 
activities in the strategic makeup of a firm, the more 
organization structure will be organic, and the greater 




The more reliance on marketing promotional 
strategies, the more influential the marketing oriented 
units will be, with respect to strategic decisions.
Anderson and Paine (1975) also, in their perceptually 
based strategy model, proposed that policy makers' decisions 
are responses to their perceptions of environmental 
uncertainty and their perceived need for internal changes. 
Their response patterns, in turn, affect several 
organizational properties, including organizational form 
(structure).
The idea of a link between strategy and structure of 
the organizations has its origins in Chandler's (1962) 
historical study of large American enterprises. Chandler's 
main thesis is that structure of an organization follows its 
growth strategies that are most important for insuring 
long-term survival of business organizations. He suggests 
that firms change their strategies from volume expansion to 
geographical expansion, to vertical integration, and finally 
to product diversification in order to employ resources more 
profitably in the face of changing technology, income, and 
population. Each new strategy, however, poses new 
administrative problems. Solutions to these problems require 
new or, at least, refashioned structures that fit the new 
strategies.
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Chandler has noted that most firms in his study started 
out initially as plants, warehouses, sales offices, and the 
like, in a single industry, a single location, and a single 
function of either manufacturing, wholesaling, or sales. 
Volume expansion was the first stage of growth, and created a 
need for an administrative office. Next, geographical 
expansion strategy was adopted which called for functional 
departmental offices in order to handle the problems of 
interunit coordination, specialization, and standardization. 
The next stage, i.e., vertical integration, gave rise to the 
problem of balancing the sequential movement of goods through 
the interdependent functions of manufacturing, wholesaling, 
and sales. The outcome was the development of forecasts, 
schedules, and capacity balancing techniques. Finally, 
product-diversification strategy entailed problems of 
appraisal and evaluation of product divisions and alternative 
investment opportunities. The remedy was the evolution of 
the new multi-divisional form of structure. In this form, 
the divisions were responsible for short-term operating 
decisions, while the central office was responsible for 
long-run strategic decisions.
Chandler's findings provoked a number of empirical 
studies, especially by the Harvard policy group. First, 
Wrigley (1970) refined the theory of diversification by
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distinguishing the four different strategies of single­
product business, dominant business, related business, and 
unrelated business. He found that single-product firms are 
always organized functionally. The dominant business 
category, however, is associated with multi-divisional forms 
by managing the dominant business through a functional 
structure and the diverse products through a divisional 
structure. The companies that are diversified into related 
and unrelated businesses predominantly choose 
multi-divisional structure. From Wrigley's data it is clear 
that structure follows strategy, and that diversification 
results in multi-divisional forms. The same type of analysis 
is also replicated for European countries, with generally the 
same results (see, for example, Pavan, 1976).
Rumelts's (1974) study is probably the most 
comprehensive research of this nature. He elaborated 
Wrigley's (1970) diversification typology and identified 
nine different strategies to characterize his sample of U.S. 
firms from the Fortune 500. He also incorporated the 
financial performance of the firms in the study to test 
strategy-structure-performance relations. Rumelt, like 
others, supported the idea that structure follows strategy. 
But he failed to show that high performance comes from a 
match between strategy and structure.
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PROPOSITION III-4.
The more strategy emphasizes proliferation of a 
wider range of products, the wider will be the C.E.O's 
span of management, and the more decentralized will be 
the structure.
On the OT camp Child (1972), has been given credit for 
stimulating interest in environment-strategy-structure 
performance type of relationships. He has criticized the 
conventional contingency models of explaining organizational 
structure on the grounds that: "these models proceed to the
simplest theoretical solution which is that the contextual 
factors determine structural variables because of certain, 
primarily economic, constraints the former are assumed to 
impose" (Child, 1972:2). He then continues by suggesting 
that ..."this simple theory is inadequate primarily because 
it fails to give due attention to the agency of choice by 
whoever have the power to direct the organization" (Child, 
1972:2).
Building on Child's theoretical argument, several 
writers have examined a variety of variables in search of 
common patterns or configurations of environment, strategy, 
and structure. Montanari (1979) reports on an examination 
of such a model, using a large sample of U.S. and Canadian 
firms. He operationalized the strategic choice concept in 
terms of perceived power and perceived managerial discretion.
He succeeded in partially supporting the model. Miles and 
Snow (1978) developed and examined a typology of 
organizations in a study of firms in the four industries of 
textbook publishing, electronics, food processing, and 
hospitals. They propose that more proactive organizaion 
types (e.g., prospectors and analyzers) tend to adopt an 
organistic organization structure and a human resource 
approach to management.
Miller and Friesen (1980) through a factor analytic 
technique have constructed a typology of organizational 
transition and adaption processes. These organizational 
types, that they refer to as archetypes, include clusters of 
intercorrelated environmental, strategic, and structural 
variables. This research suggests that there are different 
approaches through which an organization can achieve success 
(or failure).
It is interesting to note that a remarkable consistency 
in thrust is observable among these foregoing works. That 
is, there is a trend in this type of work to de-emphasize 
simple bivariate relationships among few variables in search 
of causation. What is being attempted is a synthesis or an 
emphasis on clusters among many attributes in search of 
Gestalts. In any case, despite the differences in scope, 
sample, and methodology, these studies have at least one
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overwhelmingly common conclusion. Namely, combinations of 
environment, strategy, and structure of high-performing 
organizations differ from combinations associated with low 
performance organizations.
PROPOSITIONS III-5.
Combination of strategy and internal structure of 
high-performance firms is significantly different from 
that of low-performance firms.
PROPOSITIONS III-6.
Combination of industry characteristics, strategy, 
and organization structure associated with 
high-performance firms is significantly different from 
'that of low-performance firms.
CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY
In this section, the major methodological aspects of 
this dissertation research are presented.
I. THE SAMPLE:
Sampling for this study was done from corporations 
included in the standard and Poor's COMPUSTAT data base. 
Specifically, the 1980 industrial annual and OTC 
(Over-The-Counter) annual COMPCJSTAT tapes provide a variety 
of profitability, financial, and operating information 
covering over 3200 corporations. The companies include all 
New York and American Stock Exchange companies and a large 
number of over-the-counter stocks. The sample for the study 
includes only the less diversified manufacturing firms on 
these tapes. Manufacturing companies are used mainly 
because industrial market data are more frequently available 
for manufacturing industries. Data on about 1700 firms 
operating primarily in manufacturing industries (i.e., the 
Standard Industrial Classifications of 2000-3999) are 
available on the tapes. Less diversified firms from the list 
of 1700 are used for two reasons. First, a highly 
diversified firm is involved in multiple lines of business
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in a variety of industries with different structural 
characteristics. As such, it would be difficult and even 
somewhat meaningless to designate one specific industry with 
specific structural attributes as the competitive arena in 
which it operates.
Secondly, the economic performance and financial data 
provided by the COMPUSTAT tapes are not broken down in terms 
of a company's different lines of business. They are 
aggregated for all of the businesses a company is involved 
in. For these data to be more meaningful and more 
representative of the strategic tendencies of a business 
unit, a sample of less diversified (idealistically, 
not diversified) firms was deemed appropriate. For the 
foregoing reasons, only manufacturing firms with operations 
in one or at most two 4-digit SIC categories were selected. 
Among these were a few companies for which only 3-digit 
primary SIC numbers were provided by the data base. The 
1980 Standard and Poor1s Register of Corporations was used 
to secure the 4-digit primary SIC numbers. In a few cases 
when such information was furnished by neither of the two 
sources, the company was eliminated as a prospective sample 
member.
The previous screening processes left us with about 174 
companies. Out of these, six companies which operate
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primarily in industries with regional markets were dropped 
(i.e., soft-drink, cement, and concrete industries).
Another group of six firms were excluded, from which three 
companies were based in countries other than the U.S.
(i.e., Canada and Mexico), two could not be located, and one 
had been shut down and gone out of business. The remaining 
162 less diversified manufacturing corporations on the 
COMPUSTAT tapes comprised the target sample for this 
research. These companies, with an average sale of 77 
million dollars and average personnel size of 1300, 
represented 68 different 4-digit SIC’s. Prom the 162 members 
of target sample, 48 participated in the study and supplied 
the information necessary for the project (a response rate of 
about 30%). The descriptive statistics on this final sample 
and those of the target sample are presented and compared in 
Table 3-1. It is obvious from this table that the research 
sample is indeed a reasonable representative of the target 
sample. It also covers a broad and divergent cross section 
of different manufacturing industries, a characteristic 
highly desirable for the present study.
II. DATA COLLECTION:
Secondary published sources and questionnaires filled
Target Sample (n = T62)______Research Sample (n = 48)






Std. deviation 1560 1499
range 35-9700 35-7725







Table 3-1. Comparison of the Research Sample with the Initial Target Sample
out by the chief operating officers of the companies have 
been the primary sources of data for this dissertation (see 
Table 3-3, page 61). Statistics necessary for computing 
some of the structural attributes of the industries (namely, 
concentration ratios and barriers to entry) were obtained 
from Census of Manufacturers and its special report. 
Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing Industries. These are 
published once every five years by the U.S. Bureau of Census. 
The latest issues (published in 1979) contain industry data 
pertaining to 1977. Statistics concerning rates of 
industrial growth came from U.S. Industrial Outlook,
U.S. Department of Industrial Economics, 1981. And the 
product differentiation information was acquired from 
Schonfeld and Associates' estimates of 1979 advertising-to- 
sales ratios reported in Advertising Age, July, 1980.
Industry profitability ratios were available in the Robert 
Morris Associates' Annual Statement Studies, 1981.
Information related to firm profitability ratios and the 
financial ratios representing certain selected dimensions of 
actual business strategy of the companies was retrieved from 
the COMPUSTAT tapes.
Perceptual measures of rivalry in the industry, along 
with the data on internal organizational structure and_ 
perceived competitive strategies of the firms were collected
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through a survey research method. Questionnaires 
accompanied by a standard cover letter were mailed out to 
the companies. The letters, addressed to the chief 
operating officers, requested their participation in the 
research and promised confidentiality for the information 
obtained. This initial inquiry secured responses from 33 
companies. Three weeks later, reminder letters along with a 
second copy of the questionnaire were mailed out to those 
individuals who had not yet replied. The second contact 
resulted in 15 additional responses, providing a total of 48 
responses. Copies of the cover letters are present in 
Appendix A.
III. VARIABLES:
A. Industrial Market Structure:
Bain (1968:2) has defined market structure as 
"those characteristics of the organization of a market that 
seem to exercise a strategic influence on the nature of 
competition and pricing." The five most important dimensions 
of this construct were considered for the purpose of this 
study:
1. CONCENTRATION RATIO: This variable concerns
the extent of inequity in the number and size distribution 
of firms in different industries. As a widely used measure
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of monopoly (competition), 4-firm concentration ratio was 
defined here as the sum of the percentage of total shipment 
in the firms' primary industry contributed by the largest 
four firms in the industry. In addition to this measure, 
8-firm concentration ratio was also used.
2. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION: Product homogeneity 
or differentiation is primarily a function of the degree of 
substitution among competing sellers' products. Products are 
differentiated when for some real or imagined reason one 
firm's products are preferred by at least some buyers over 
rival products at a given price. Price differentials are 
possible and profits tend to be higher in industries that are 
highly differentiated. This variable was operationalized by 
the ratio of a firm's primary industry's advertising 
expenditures to the value of sales. The rationale for using 
this proxy was taken from Bain (1968), who concluded that 
advertising is the major source of product differentiation in 
the consumer goods industries. Producer goods industries, he 
concluded, have nearly homogeneous products, with 
insignificant or slightly differentiated products.
3. BARRIERS TO ENTRY: "New entrants to an 
industry bring new capacity, the desire to gain market 
share, and often substantial resources. Prices can be bid
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down or incumbents' costs inflated as a result, reducing 
profitability" (Porter, 1980:7). Barriers to entry are 
indicative of the difficulty new firms will have to enter an 
industry. Two proxy measures were used to capture some 
sources of barriers to entry:
a. Barriers to entry due to economies of scale 
enjoyed by established firms were measured, based on 
estimates of minimum efficient plant scale (MES). MES is 
estimated by average plant size (in terms of sales) among the 
largest plants accounting for 50 percent of industry 
shipment. This average plant size was divided by total 
industry shipment to obtain the scale economies variable 
(Comanor and Wilson, 1967).
b. The second type of barriers to entry is due to 
"absolute capital requirements" for entry. This amount of 
capital required for entry at the scale of a single 
efficient plant is based on the above-mentioned estimate of 
scale economies. The average output level of plants at 
minimum efficient scale was multiplied by the ratio of 
industry total assets to total shipment (Comanor and Wilson, 
1967).
4. RATE OF CHANGE IN DEMAND: This variable is
the reflection of the extent of industry growth. It was 
tapped by the percent of change in total sales (in millions
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of constant 1972 dollars) over the latest four-year period 
for which this data was available (1975-1978).
B. Industry Profitability:
Three-year average return on assets for the firm's 
primary industry was used as the measure of industry 
profitability.
C . Perceived Competitive Environment:
Perceived intensity and nature of rivalry
variables were measured by a variant of an instrument 
designed by Khandwalla (1976). The chief operating officers 
were asked to rate on seven-point scales the intensity of 
rivalry in their primary industries with respect to price, 
promotion, sales and distribution, and product quality and 
variety. They have also rated on other seven-point scales 
the importance of each of these to their firms' 
profitability. The rating for intensity of each type of 
rivalry was multiplied by the rating for its importance. By 
taking the square root of the product of these two numbers, 
a weighted measure of the magnitude of that competition 
experienced by the firm was provided. The same procedure 
was followed to obtain the scores for magnitude of 
technological change resulting in new processes and that 
resulting in new products. Finally, all the scores on 
different types of rivalry and technological change were 
summed to operationalize intensity of overall rivalry in the
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industry, as perceived by the firms' top executives 
(Khandwalla, 1973).
D. Strategy and Strategic Complexity;
The instrument used for capturing the perceived 
strategic posture of a firm was adopted from Bourgeois' 
competitive weapons questionnaire (1980). The original 
questionnaire consists of a list of 23 industry-relevant 
weapons to be rated by C.E.O.'s on a 1-to-5 scale of 
importance. A few modifications on this instrument were 
deemed appropriate, which resulted in the 26-item 
questionnaire used in this project. Strategic complexity was 
measured by the number of strategic dimensions on the 
Bourgeois instrument that were viewed very important to a 
company by its chief operating officer— that is, the number 
of items on the strategy questionnaire that were marked 5 
(i.e., very important) by the respondents.
For the purpose of this study, an attempt was also 
made to objectively measure some of the aspects of the 
strategic makeup of the companies. The data required to 
carry out this task were retrieved predominantly from 
COMPUSTAT tapes, except for the production capacity 
utilization that was collected through the questionnaire.












Plant and Equipment 
Modernization
Production Capacity
Advertising expenditures as a percentage of 
Sales (3 years average)
Current Ratio=Current assets/current 
liabilities (3 years average)
Total Assets/Total Sales (3 year average)
Collection Period=Receivables Capital x 365
Sales
(3 year average)
Net book value of the plant and equipment/ 
gross book value of the plant and equipment* 
(3 year average)
Average percent of production capacity 
currently utilized
* See Schendel and Patton (1976)
Table 3-2. Objective Strategic Variables and Their Operationalization
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E . Organization Structure;
For the purpose of this study, a multi-dimensional 
concept of structure is adopted. The structural variables 
included in the study are as follows:
1. C.E.O.'s SPAN OF CONTROL: Refers to the number of 
people directly reporting to the C.E.O.
2. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE C.E.O: This 
variable is concerned with the extent to which the chief 
executives of the firms have delegated authority to others 
to make decisions regarding several strategically important 
issues. Scores on this dimension of organization structure 
were secured by Khandwalla's (1973) instrument.
3. FORMALIZATION: This variable refers to the extent
to which policies, rules, procedures, operating 
instructions, and communications are written.. It was 
measured by the number of specific role-defining 
documents— from a set list— which exist in organizations, 
and, in some cases, the extent of their application or 
distribution (Inkson, et al., 1970).
4. AUTONOMY: "An organization lacks autonomy if 
decisions are taken at a level of authority outside the 
organization's own structure" (Inkson, et al., 1970:328). 
Therefore, autonomy (or lack of it) was determined on the 
basis of the number of decisions which are taken at a level
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of authority higher than the organization's chief executive 
(for example, by the board of directors or by the parent 
organization).
5. DECENTRALIZATION: Centralization has to do with
the locus of authority for making decisions affecting 
organizational operations. Degree of decentralization was 
captured based on the number of decisions (from a list of 
twenty-three) made at various levels of the organizational 
hierarchy (Inkson, et al,, 1970).
6-8. DECENTRALIZATION OF MARKETING, PRODUCTION, AND
OPERATING DECISIONS: A factor-analytic procedure
similar to that of Grinyer and Yasai-Ardakani (1980) was 
followed to find measures of decentralization of different 
types of decisions. Principal component analysis on the 
overall decentralization scale and an oblique rotation on 
the result of it were carried out. Three distinct clusters 
of variables emerged— marketing decisions, production 
decisions, and operating decisions. The scores on the 
related items in each of these subscales were then summed to 
secure measurements for decentralization of their respective 
cluster. A more detailed discussion of this procedure will 
be presented in Chapter Four of the dissertation.
9. INTERDEPARTMENTAL STRATEGIC INFLUENCE: This
variable is concerned with the extent of influence exerted
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by different organizational units with respect to strategic 
decision making in the firms. The 5-point Likert type scale 
designed to tap this structural dimension is presented in 
Appendix B.
F. Firm Profitability:
Organization performance has to be assessed in 
reference to some criteria. It could, however, be defined 
and measured in different ways, depending upon whose frame 
of reference you adopt and whose interest you think an 
organization should serve (Parsons, 1960; Steers, 1975). 
Profitability is the performance criterion employed in this 
research and its use can be justified on the following 
grounds. First, survival is the ultimate test of 
organization effectiveness. But profitability is a necessary 
requirement for long-term survival of private economic 
enterprises, including the ones that are the subjects of this 
study. Secondly, profitability is a concept that is 
meaningful and commonly used across the three disciplines of 
10, BP, and 0T. Thirdly, it is the one that is predominantly 
used as a performance objective by industry executives.
Three indices of profitability, i.e., return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and return on sales 
(ROS) were constructed. They are all three-year averages 
covering the period of 1978-1980. The three-year span should
60
be sufficient to reduce the effects of an exceptional year, 
without, at the same time, extending too far back to a time 
when the attributes of the companies might have been 
significantly different from those measured in the research.
Table 3-3 (page 61) provides a summary of all of the 
research variables, their operationalization, and their 
sources of data. Copies of all the questionnaire instruments 
used for the research are presented in Appendix B. Appendix 
C represents selected descriptive statistics on all research 
variables.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS:
The analysis of the data included two major stages. In 
the first stage, certain preliminary steps had to be taken 
in order to prepare the data for the actual analysis and 
testing of the propositions. Specifically, factor analysis 
was used to develop the different subscales measuring 
different types of decentralization. Likewise, a factor- 
analytic procedure was used to pool the 26 perceived 
strategy variables together into a manageable number of 
constructs. And, finally, for the reasons discussed in the 
later paragraphs of this section, cluster analysis was 
employed to designate the high-performance and 
low-performance groups of companies. After the foregoing 
preliminary steps were accomplished, the task of verification
Table 3-3. Major Research Variables, Their Measurements, and Sources of Data
VARIABLES MEASUREMENTS SOURCE OF DATA
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE:
1-1 .  C o n c e n t ra t io n 4-form  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  r a t i o Census o f  M a n f a c tu re r s ,  1979
1 .2 .  P r o d u c t  D i f f e r e n t a t l o n  
1 -3 .  B a r r i e r s  t o  E ntry
In d u s t ry  a d v e r t i s i n g  e x p e n d i t u r e s /  
I n d u s t ry  s a l e s
Schonfeld  & A s s o c i a t e s ,  
A d v e r t i s in g  Age, J u ly  1980
l - 3 - a .  Economies o f  S c a le Minimum e f f i c i e n t  p l a n t  s c a l e /  
t o t a l  I n d u s t ry  sh ipm ent
Census o f  M an u fac tu re s ,  1979
l - 3 - b .  A b so lu te  C a p i t a l  Requirem ent Minimum e f f i c i e n t  p l a n t  s c a l e  X 
( i n d u s t r y  a s s e t s / i n d u s t r y  sh ipm ent)
Census o f  M an ufac tu res ,  1979
1-4 .  R a te  o f  Change In Demand P e r  c e n t  o f  change in t o t a l  In d u s t ry  
o u tp u t  o v e r  t h e  l a s t  4 - y e a r  p e r io d  
f o r  which d a t a  i s  a v a i l a b l e  (1975-1978)
U.S. I n d u s t r i a l  O u t lo o k ,  1981
INDUSTRY PROFITABILITY
l l - l .  In d u s t ry  R e tu rn  on A s s e t s In d u s try  P r e t a x  P ro f  I t / I n d u s t r y  t o t a l  
a s s e t s  ( 3 - y e a r  av e rag e )
Annual S ta tem en t  S tu d i e s ,  198
PERCEIVED COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
f 11—1. P e rc e iv e d  I n t e n s i t y  of R iv a l ry Khandwal l a ,  1976 q u e s t i o n n a l r e
111-2 . P e rc e iv e d  N a tu re  o f  R iv a l ry K handw alla ,  1976 q u e s t io n n a l  re
111-3. T ech n o lo g ica l  Change Khandwalla ,  1976 q u e s t io n n a l  re
STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC COMPLEXITY:
IV-1. S u b je c t iv e  Measurement B o u rg e o is ,  1980 q u e s t i o n n a l r e
IV -2. O b je c t i v e  Measurement See T a b le  3 - 2 ,  page 56. COMPUSTAT t a p e s
Table 3-3 (continued). Major Research Variables, Their Measurements, and Sources of Data
V. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE:
V-1. In t e rd e p a r tm e n ta l  S t r a t e g i c  I n f lu e n c e  
V-2. D e le g a t io n  o f  A u th o r i ty  by t h e  C .E .O . Khandwal l a ,  1973 
V-3. Autonomy
V-4. D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  
V-5. F o rm a l iz a t io n
V-6, C .E .O 's  Span o f  Contro l
VI. FIRM PROFITABILITY
V I-1 .  R e tu rn  on A s s e t s
VI- 2 .  R e tu rn  on Equity
V I-3 .  R e tu rn  on S a le s
Inkson e t  a l . ,  1970 
Inkson e t  a I . ,  1970 
Inkson e t  a I . ,  1970
Number o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  r e p o r t i n g  d i r e c t l y  
t o  C .E.O.
P e r - t a x  P r o f i t / t o t a l  a s s e t s  
( 3 - y e a r  av e rag e )
P e r - t a x  P r o f i t / s h a r e h o l d e r s '  e q u i t y  
(3 - y e a r  a v e ra g e )
P e r - t a x  P r o f i t / t o t a l  s a l e s  
( 3 - y e a r  av e rag e )
q u e s t i o n n a l r e  
q u e s t i o n n a l r e  
q u e s t io n n a l  re  
q u e s t io n n a l  re 
q u e s t io n n a l  re  
q u e s t i o n n a l r e
COMPUSTAT t a p e s  
COMPUSTAT t a p e s  
COMPUSTAT t a p e s
cnNJ
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of the research propositions was undertaken.
The direct pairwise relationships among the different 
variables and constructs were tested by zero-order product 
moment correlations. Next, attempts were made to show that 
firm performance is a function of the interaction between 
a) competitive environment and strategy, b) competitive 
environment and internal structure, c) strategy and 
structure, and, finally, d) combination of all of the above 
mentioned factors. Since the data obtained on the firms and 
their environments invariably consist of observed values of a 
set of mutually correlated variables, the analysis 
necessitates consideration of the variables together rather 
than one at a time. One technique that lends itself well to 
this form of investigation is discriminant analysis. This 
technique is concerned with the problem of distinguishing 
(discriminating) between two (or more) populations on the 
basis of observations of a multivariate nature. It is 
similar to multiple regression analysis in that it tries to 
predict a dependent variable as a function of a set of 
independent variables. However, instead of trying to find a 
model that best fits the data as regression analysis does, 
discriminant analysis tries to determine weighted linear 
combination(s) of independent variables that best 
discriminate between two (or more) a priori defined groups.
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The stepwise method is useful when, as in this case, analysis 
includes a relatively large number of independent 
variables. It involves entering the independent variables 
into the discriminant function one at a time on the basis of 
their contributions to the discriminating power of the 
variables already in the model. This way, variables which 
are not useful in discriminating between the groups are 
eliminated and a linear combination of the reduced set of 
useful variables is indentified (Hair_et alr, 1979; Klecka, 
1980).
One important point to note in applying discriminant 
analysis is, however, that the groups to be delineated must 
be specified in advance. In the case of this study, the two 
subsamples of low- and high-performance firms have to be 
designated. Assignment of the companies to these two groups 
is accomplished by using Cluster Analysis. This is a 
procedure which classifies objects (firms, in this case) into 
two (or more) clusters in such a manner that each object 
possesses a high degree of similarity with other members of 
the cluster with respect to some selection criteria 
(profitability, in this case). The resulting groups should, 
therefore, have high internal (within cluster) homogeneity 
and high external (between cluster) heterogeneity (Green and 
Tull (1978). The outcome of the cluster analysis determines
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the values of the criterion (i.e., dependent) variable for 
the stepwise discriminant procedure. More detailed 
discussion of the steps followed is covered in Chapter Four 
of the dissertation.
CHAPTER POUR
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
This chapter consists of two parts. The purpose of 
Part One is to report on the results of the preliminary data 
preparation steps that were undertaken. As such, this 
section will include discussions of factor analysis of the 
decentralization scale, factor analysis of the perceived 
strategy variables, and cluster analysis of the companies, 
based on their profitability. In Part Two of the chapter, 
however, patterns of interrelationships of the research 
variables are examined in order to verify the plausibility 
of the research propositions put forth in Chapter Two of the 
dissertation.
PART ONE: DATA PREPARATION
I. Factor Analysis of the Decentralization Scale:
To construct subscales that measure decentralization of 
different types of decisions, factor analysis was performed 
on the Inkson et al.'s (1970) decentralization scale. 
Principal component analysis, using the SAS program, was 
applied to the data. As a result, seven factors with 
eigenvalues of larger than one were initially extracted. 
Based on a scree test (Kim & Mueller, 1978:44-45) on
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these principal components, four factors were retained. To 
interpret and name these underlying dimensions of the 
decentralization data, orthogonal (Varimax) and obilque 
{Promax) rotation of the factor patterns were carried out, 
using the SAS program. Rotation of factor patterns 
redistributes the portion of variance explained by the 
factors and achieves a simpler and theoretically more 
meaningful factor structure. Orthogonal rotation creates 
factors in such a way that the factor axes are maintained at 
90 degrees to one another. "Therefore, the correlation 
between factors is arbitarily determined to be zero" (Hair et 
al., 1979:221). In this case, however, the Varimax rotated 
factor structure was very similar to the oblique rotated 
solution. In addition, the oblique solution showed existence 
of interdependence among the factors (Table 4-1). Therefore, 
it was concluded that the imposition of the independence 
assumption by the orthogonal rotational technique was 
unrealistic and masked the true interrelationships of the 
factors. For this reason, and in order to provide a more 
realistic representation of the decentralization constructs 
and their interdependencies, the Promax (oblique) rotated
v
factor solution was adopted (See Table 4-1). Notice that the 
highest factor loading of every variable (marked by an 
asterisk) is 0.50 or higher. The solution closely resembles
Table 4-1. Promax Rotated Factor Solution For The Decentralization Scale
List of Decision Items: FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4
1. TO CREATE NEW LEVELS OF SUPERVISION *0.68780 0.25306 -0.13155 0.02613
2. APPOINTMENT OF SUPERVISORY STAFF FROM OUTSIDE 0.49562 -0.20669 -0.07109 *0.51349
3. PROMOTION OF SUPERVISORY STAFF 0.49218 -0.25114 -0.03996 *0.59530
4. SALARIES OF SUPERVISORY STAFF 0.45747 -0.07279 0.05329 *0.52005
5. TO SPEND UNBUDGETED MONEY ON CAPITAL ITEMS *0.55366 0.01300 0.12854 -0.13038
6. TO SPEND UNBUDGETED MONEY ON REVENUE ITEMS *0.52949 0.19621 0.00191 0.11218
7. WHAT TYPE, OR BRAND EQUIPMENT BE PURCHASED -0.23687 0.39860 0.10361 *0.56430
8. TO DETERMINE A NEW PRODUCT OR SERVICE 0.14703 *0.69806 -0.25635 0. 17479
9. TO DETERMINE MARKETING TERRITORIES COVERED 0.04203 *0.64548 0.06081 -0.05423
10. THE EXTENT AND TYPE OF MARKET TO BE AIMED FOR 0.13166 *0.57804 0.00304 -0.11424
1 r. WHAT SHALL BE COSTED 0.02520 *0.52716 0.43027 0.04996
12. WHAT SHALL BE INSPECTED 0.05020 0.14603 *0.75465 0.12817
13. WHAT OPERATIONS SHALL BE WORK STUDIED 0.19377 -0.21598 *0.65098 -0.08275
14. DISMISS A SUPERVISOR *0.78392 -0.00413 -0.13070 0.13728
15. TRAINING METHODS TO BE USED *0.50615 -0.43785 0.20585 -0.02301
16. BUYING PROCEDURES -0.12418 0.03262 *0.77391 0.34179
17. WHICH SUPPLIERS OF MATERIALS ARE TO BE USED -0.10417 0.16415 0.19906 *0.77492
18. WHAT AND HOW MANY WELFARE FACILITIES 0.24045 -0. 15082 *0.51507 -0.02764
19. THE PRICE OF THE PRODUCT OR SERVICE 0.28375 *0.57979 -0.18388 0.25090
20. TO ALTER RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPECIALIST UNITS *0.65196 0.24474 0.22214 -0.06589
21 . TO ALTER RESPONSIBILITIES OF LINE DEPARTMENTS *0.68241 -0.05680 0.17524 0.00477
22. TO CREATE A NEW DEPARTMENT *0.77716 0.30433 0.06034 -0.13302
23. TO CREATE A NEW JOB *0.68840 0.25199 0.20524 -0.03681
VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY THE FACTORS 6.236686 3.143369 3.286387 3.508517
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the results obtained by Grinyer and Yasai-Ardakani (1980) in 
a similar attempt. High loadings of the items 2, 3, and 4 on
both factors 1 and 4, and examination of the correlation
between these two factors (Table 4-1) suggest that they have 
a significant amount of common variance and, in fact, tap the 
same dimension of the data. Hence, they should be combined 
and treated as one factor. This conclusion is reinforced by 
the fact that the contents of both factors are predominantly 
related to personnel and administrative decisions. As such, 
factors 1 and 4 were combined to create a composite index 
named "Decentralization of Operative Decisions." The score 
of this subscale was obtained by summing the questionnaire 
ratings on items with their highest loadings on factors 1 and 
4 (namely, items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, and 17).
The variables with their highest loadings on factor 2
center predominantly on marketing decisions. Factor 2 was, 
thus, named accordingly. The subscale represented by this 
factor (i.e., Decentralization of Marketing Decisions) was 
scored by aggregating the ratings on items 8, 9, 10, 11, 
and 19.
The pattern of loading coefficients in factor 3 
indicates that this factor is, in essence, production 
oriented. Therefore, the construct reflected in this factor 
was named "Decentralization of Production Decisions," and was
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measured by the sum of items 12, 13, 16, and 18.
II. Factor Analysis of the Perceived Strategy Variables:
The perceived-strategy part of the questionnaire 
included 26 items. For the sake of data reduction and 
having a more manageable number of variables to deal with, a 
two-stage factor analytic procedure was applied to these 
variables. The hierarchical refactoring technique adqpted 
is a variant of the higher order factoring used for data 
reduction purposes {Harman, 1967; Rummel, 1970).
The objective of the first stage was to statistically 
(rather than a priori) collapse the 26 variables into a few 
independent but crude and broad categories, based on their 
pattern of intercorrelations. This was accomplished through 
an orthogonal rotation (Varimax) of the three major principal 
components extracted (see Table 4-2). Notice that the 
questionnaire item concerning importance of "Low Prices" is 
not included in the factor solution. This is so because this 
item had a very low communality and therefore did not load 
highly on any of the factors. As such, this variable 
represented a separate and different dimension of the 
strategy scale and deserved exclusion from the factor 
analysis and treatment as an independent construct.
In the second stage, the contents of each of the three













1 1 . CUSTOMER CREDIT
12. CUSTOMER SERVICE
13. WIDE PRODUCT RANGE
14. NARROW PRODUCT RANGE




19. PREDICTING CUSTOMER TASTE
20. PREDICT COMPETITORS' ACTIONS
21 . IMPROVE PROCESS TECHNOLOGY
22. INCREASE CAPACITY USE
23. EXPAND CAPACITY
24. INCREASE MARKET SHARE
25. MERGERS
EIGENVALUE
PERCENT OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED
Solution
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 COMMUNALI1
*0.46312 -0.11983 0.45421 0.435146
*0.55407 0.10274 0.25204 0.381076
0.13657 *0.72300 0.15418 0.565152
0.22551 *0.70121 0.22521 0.593267
*0.46697 -0.06492 0.24036 0.280045
*0.55654 -0.09550 0.16534 0.346199
0.27568 *-0.52549 -0.01275 0.352305
0.20770 *0.45982 -0.06187 0.258401
-0.03609 *0.41906 -0.07034 0.181861
*0.43426 0.19678 -0.02651 0.228004
*0.65004 0.30393 0.08204 0.521662
*0.36678 -0.05942 0.15781 0.162965
0.13269 -0.42111 *0.42410 0.374803
-0.18055 *0.54620 -0.13850 0.350116
0.37715 -0.07362 *0.47011 0.368672
0.43191 -0.03416 *0.48419 0.422156
*0.56033 0.13354 -0.09064 0.340015
*0.41311 -0.07641 0. 19394 0.214110
-0.06481 0.28174 *0.66854 0.530521
0.07853 -0.04153 *0.63887 0.416048
*0.71081 -0.39544 0.03057 0.662560
*0.7 57 22 -0.25955 -0.06278 0.644688
*0.59977 0.09107 -0.29323 0.454002
-0.09365 0.31804 *0.53989 0.401405
0.06655 -0.30597 *0.59404 0.450926
4.31043 2.85203 2.76135 9.92342
17.24171 1 1 .40810 11.04500 39.69369
NJ
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initial classes of variables (i.e., the above-mentioned 
factors) were examined and decomposed further into more 
refined subgroups composed of more strongly interrelated 
variables. This was achieved by factor analyzing each of 
the three groups of variables that loaded the highest on 
factor 1, factor 2, and factor 3 separately. Needless to 
say, the rotation method used to obtain the final factor 
analytic solutions was of oblique type (i.e., Promax). The 
final outcome of the described hierarchical factor analytic 
procedure are the eight factors presented in Tables 4-3, 
4-4, and 4-5. Notice that the highest factor loading of 
every variable is larger than 0.40 in all cases and that 
factors were named according to the nature and the signs of 
the more dominant variables represented by them.
The justification for the application of the two-stage 
factoring procedure lay partly in the diverse nature and 
relatively large number of variables that, in the first 
stage, loaded highly on more than one factor (on factors 1 
and 2, in particular). Factors with such characteristics 
are very difficult to interpret and may well be 
theoretically meaningless, especially if used as input to 
other predictive models. The solution to this problem was 
first approached through retaining a larger number of 
factors (e.g., 4, 5, 6). However, the results were
Table 4-3. Second Stage Factor Analysis on the First Group of Strategy Variables
Promax Rotated Factor Solution
Variables FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
Financial Customer-service Production & operations
Consciousness based strategy expansion strategy
1. FIN LIQUIDITY *0.71905 -0.22498 0.23677
2. NEW FUNDS *0.48223 -0.11507 0.41836
5. COST REDUCTION *0.85269 -0.01196 0.12814
6. EMPL EFFICIENCY *0.56179 0.52348 -0.19925
10. PRDCT WARRANTY -0.20209 *0.66476 0.1 1268
11. CUSTOMER CREDIT 0.19701 *0.59071 0.15662
12. CUST SERVICE -0.10692 *0.68044 0.09081
17. BCKWRD INTEGRATION -0.01386 0.34832 *0.47313
18. FRWRD INTEGRATION -0.02057 *0.73677 -0.06223
21 . IMPROVE PROCESS TECH 0.28457 0.00452 *0.64448
22. INCREASE CAPACITY USE 0.39517 0.29456 *0.48306
23. EXPAND CAPACITY -0.18731 0.00594 *0.88950
VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY THE FACTORS 2.69 7 272 2.740639 2.564618 8.003
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Table 4-4. Second Stage Factor Analysis on the Second Group of Strategy Variables
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Table 4-5. Second Stage Factor Analysis on the Third Group of Strategy Variables
Promax Rotated Factor Solution
Variables
13. WIDE PROD RANGE
15. NEW PROD DEV
16. PROD IMPROVEMENT
19. PREDICTING COST TASTE
20. PRED COPT ACTION 
22. INCREASE MKT SHRE 
25. MERGERS
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disappointing in every case, for the rotation factor 
solutions did not even resemble a "simple structure." That 
is, a relatively large number of variables loaded highly on 
two or more factors. The problem was also compounded in 
each case by several variables that spread their variance so 
thinly and evenly on a number of factors that they did not 
load significantly on any of the factors. The two-stage 
factoring was, therefore, deemed appropriate and indeed 
proved successful.
Since the eight factors after the second stage were to 
replace the original variables in further analysis, factor 
scores had to be computed. Factor scores are composite 
measures for each factor representing each firm. After 
computation of the factor scores, therefore, each company is 
represented by only eight summary measures (factor scores) 
rather than the original 25 strategic variables factor 
analyzed.
III. Clustering Firms into High- and Low-Performance Groups:
In order to perform stepwise discriminant analysis on 
combinations of different groups of variables to test 
propositions 1-6, II-6, III-5, and III-6, firms first had 
to be assigned to low-performance and high-performance
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subsamples. One way to do this was to define a cutoff point 
such as the mean or the median of the profitability values. 
Each company could then be assigned to the high-performance 
group if its profitability surpassed the cutoff point, or to 
the low-performance group if its profitability fell short of 
it. The problem with such a procedure is that the selection 
of the assignment criterion (mean or median) would be an 
arbitary decision on the part of the analyst and might result 
in subgroups that are nothing more than artifacts. To avoid 
this problem, therefore, the decision was made to utilize an 
assignment procedure that would achieve the same goal but 
through a more objective and statistically valid approach.
One technique that meets these requirements is cluster 
analysis. This statistical technique assigns objects to two 
or more classes based on their similarities with, and 
distances from, other objects with respect to certain 
characteristics (predictor variables). Objects within a 
class are than assumed to be indistinguishable from one 
another.
For the purpose of this study, then, cluster analysis 
was used to assign companies to low- and high-performing 
clusters based on their profitability rates. The initial 
intention was to use the three profitability ratios (i.e., 
return on assets, return on equity, and return on sales) as
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multiple predictor variables. However, an inspection of the 
correlation coefficients among them indicated that these 
three were highly correlated (see Table 4-6). Since-cluster 
analysis is sensitive to multicollinearity, the decision was 
made to use only return on assets (ROA) alone as the 
predictor variable.
Table 4-6: Correlation Coefficients Among Profitability
Ratios
ROA ROE ROS
ROA 1 .00000 0.89505*** 0.86228***
ROE 1.00000 0.80619***
ROS 1.00000
*** Significant at 0.0001 level
Another important point with respect to clustering 
procedure that had to be taken into account was the presence 
of an outlier in the data. Where the values of ROA for 47 
of the 48 firms in the sample ranged between -15% to 43%, 
the one remaining firm had an ROA of 81 percent. Since this
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outlier had a tremendous biasing effect on calculation of 
the similarity and distance measures, it was excluded from 
the analysis at this stage. Needless to say that this firm 
is clearly a high-performer and is classified accordingly 
for further analysis. The clustering routine used produced a 
20-member cluster of high-performance companies (precluding 
the outlier) with an average ROA of 25.79 percent, and a 
27-firm cluster of low performers with an average ROA of 
-6.08 percent. The t-statistic for the difference of these 
two means is significant at .001 level. The result of the 
SAS Cluster Analysis routine and the associated cluster map 
are presented in Tables 4-7 and 4-8, Figure 4-1, repectively.
Table 4-7. Clustering of the Companies Based on Their Profit Performance (ROA)
Cluster
HIGH PERFORMANCE =














9 1 .18296 29.5000
11 1 .08695 28.2800
33 1.45999 33.0200
43 1 .35532 31 .6900
21 2.07463 40.8300





Table 4-7 (continued). 
LOW PERFORMANCE =
Clustering of the Companies Based on Their Profit Performance (ROA)
2 2 -0.24308 11.3800
2 7 -0.27614 10,9600
2 34 -0.27378 10.9900
2 5 -0.16753 12.3400
2 23 -0.14786 12.5900
2 16 -0.04791 13.8600
2 37 -0.01564 14.2700
2 39 0.05913 15.2200
2 41 0.11264 15.9000
2 24 -0.42881 9.0200
2 36 -0.38946 9 .5200
2 26 -0.32887 10.2900
2 48 -0.32887 10.2900
2 45 -0.35405 9.9700
2 31 -0.53585 7.6600
2 32 -0.57756 7.1300
2 3 -0.89708 3.0700
2 15 -0.83569 3.8500
2 12 -0.77037 4.6800
2 6 -1.05291 1.0900
2 30 -1 .02930 1.3900
2 17 -0.99388 1 .8400
2 40 -0.99152 1.8700
2 18 -1.24572 -1.3600
2 8 -2.14841 -12.8300
2 20 -2.29794 -14.7300





Table 4-7 (continued). Clustering of the Companies Based on Their Profit Performance (ROA)
DISTANCES WITHIN AND BETWEEN CLUSTERS 
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PART TWO: TESTING OF PROPOSITIONS
As obvious from the propositions laid out in an 
earlier chapter, two different modes of analysis will be 
utilized in this Part. One is a descriptive mode whereby 
the interrelationships of different classes of variables 
(i.e., environmental, strategic, and structural) are stu­
dies without any reference to how they are related to 
organizational performance. That is, the question 
addressed will mainly center on how organizations in the 
sample actually respond and adapt to environmental and 
strategic contingencies facing them. Clearly, the pre­
vailing patterns of organizational adaptability and 
coalignment, with respect to the above mentioned factors, 
do not necessarily contribute to greater economic effec­
tiveness. However, if the same variables are incorporated 
into a model, (as independent variables) with the 
corresponding levels of performance (as the dependent 
variable), normative conclusions could be drawn. In 
other words, if interdependencies of the environmental and 
organization factors are examined in light of firms' pro­
fitability levels, it might be possible to identify organi­
zational postures and environmental opportunities that are 
associated with greater economic success (or failure).
This is precisely what the second type of analysis
8 6
adopted here, i.e., the normative mode, will attempt to 
achieve.
Presentation and discussion of the research results 
in part two are organized around the same three sets of 
relationships used in Chapter Two.
I. ENVIRONMENT-STRATEGY-PERFORMANCE;
This section begins with a statistical analysis of 
the types of rivalry that top managers associate with dif­
ferent aspects of industrial market structure. This is 
followed by an examination of the different strategies 
that companies operating in different environmental con­
ditions adhere to. Finally, the dimensions of the com­
petitive environment and competitive strategy that discri­
minate between high and low performance companies are 
reported.
A. Industry Structure, Rivalry, and Performance;
This section is concerned with testing of proposi­
tions 1-1 through 1-4. The simple correlations between 
industry structure and perceived intensity and nature of 
rivalry are presented in Table 4-8. This table also 
demonstrates the relationships of these competitive 
environment variables with industry and firm profit 
indices. It is clear from the table that while the support
Table 4-8. CorrelatiorB Amrg Industry Structure, Peraelved Competitive 
Rivalry, Industry Prcfitdri.il ty, aid Firm Pr of 1 tririll ty.

































4-Firm Corceitratksn -.00576 .19673 -.15931 .09926 -.12222 -.04638 -.00® 7 -.05420 -.0403 -.01510 -.07850
8-Ffra Conaeitratlon .115(2 .2733B* -.12417 .08779 -.13124 -.09870 .15116 ,16795 -.03317 .0217 -.05332
Scale Ecouunlea .08547 .23852* -.07817 .07734 -.11535 .04356 .10137 .11954 -.0823 .ooso -.07973
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Industry Growth .25699* .19093 -.00481 .06564 -.00766 .24245* .35102*** .58468*** .18474 .30857** .22643




























1.0000 •89505*** •86128*** 
.80619***
*** P < 0.01 oo
** P < 0.05 
• P < 0.10
88
for proposition 1-2 is unequivocal, the evidence for 
proposition 1-1 is mixed.
Proposition 1-1 suggested that industry and firm pro­
fitability are positively related to concentration, pro­
duct differentiation, entry barriers, and industry growth. 
With respect to this proposition, although the relation­
ships of 8-firm concentration and the entry barrier 
variables with industry profitability (ROA) are in the 
predicted direction, the magnitude of the correlation 
coefficients are not statistically significant. In addi­
tion, neither the concentration nor the entry barrier 
variables are significantly related to measures of firm 
performance. The only industry structure variable whose 
correlations with both industry performance (ROA) and firm 
return on equity (ROE) are positive and highly signifi­
cant, is industry growth (r=0.58 and r=0.31, respectively). 
On the contrary, the measure of industry product differen­
tiation is consistently negatively related to all four of 
the industry and firm performance measures. Although 
these associations are not statistically significant at 
the firm level, they do not seem to be negligible in 
magnitude. At any rate, this finding at first appears to 
cast doubts on the validity of the related 1-0 theories, 
from which proposition 1-1 was derived. The product
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differentiation variable, however, is positively related 
to executives' perception of promotional rivalry in the 
industry (r=0.31). Also, firms operating in industries 
characterized by promotional rivalry tend to exhibit
higher levels of ROA and ROE (r=0.31 and r=0.24,
respectively). These conflicting results can, possibly, 
be reconciled as follows. Higher industry advertising 
outlay (index of product differentiation) can represent 
two different things. One, it may, as economists suggest, 
reflect a type of rather subtle rivalry whereby products 
are made to appear differentiated in the eyes of the 
buyers, making demand less price elastic. Alternatively, 
new needs and uses for the products may be created and 
promoted, thereby increasing the current customers' usage 
and demand for the product.
Two, larger advertising outlays may, as Buzzell and
Farris (1977-) argue, reflect a fierce rivalry for market
• r  \
share among the competitors*, where companies aggressively 
compete and try to attract business away from one another.
*This scenario seems to be supported by our data. 
Industry advertising to sales ratio is significantly 
correlated with companies' pursuit of market share expan­
sion strategies (r=0.30, see table 4-9). However, as 
expected, perception of promotional rivalry is not related 
to such strategic postures (r=0.13, see table 4-10).
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In the former case, the result is either monopolistic com­
petition (Chamberlin, 1933) if market concentration is 
low; or type II oligopoly (Kaysen and Turner, 1959) if 
market concentration is high. Under both of these con­
ditions, companies are likely to enjoy higher profit 
rates explaining the positive correlations between promo­
tional rivalry and performance indices.
In the later case, on the other hand, competition 
resembles a zero-sum game, where advertising dollars are 
aggressively spent to gain larger market shares at the 
cost of competitors. Market share warfare, however, is 
almost always expensive and results in lower profitabi­
lity, at least in the short run (Buzzell, Gale, and 
Sultan, 1975). The negative relations between the 
industry advertising to sales ratio and the performance 
indices are, perhaps, ref-lective of this latter situation.
Proposition 1-2 concerning the nature of rivalry in 
relation to competitive structure of industries finds 
strong support from the data. This proposition postulates 
that in industries characterized by higher concentration, 
product differentiation, and entry barriers, rivalry is 
more likely perceived to be non-price related. Table 4-8
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indicates that as industries become more oligopolistic in 
structure, the dominant mode of rivalry in them is likely 
to become non-price related in general, and of promotional 
form in particular. This is evidenced by the invariably 
negative correlations of price competition with all the 
industry structure variables; even though these correla­
tion coefficients are not large enough to be statistically 
significant. Moreover, the table also reveals that price 
competition is consistently associated with lower industry 
and firm performance, as implied in the 10 literature.
Proposition 1-3 stated that overall rivalry in faster 
growing industries would be perceived to be less intense. 
The data refutes this hypothesis, for the relationship 
between these two variables is positive and significant 
(r=0.26). Caves (19 72) offers a plausible explanation for 
this result which is discussed in detail in the next sec­
tion of this chapter.
Finally, strong support is observed from Table 4-8 
for proposition 1-4. It was stipulated that industry pro­
fitability and firm profitability would be positively 
correlated, and they indeed are. This conclusion matches
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that of Beard and Dess (1979) in a research involving 35 
manufacturing firms randomly selected from COMPUSTAT 
Industrial File. Their inter-industry variable, i.e., 
industry profitability explained a greater proportion of 
the total variance in firm performance than did firms' 
market share, debt leverage, or capital intensiveness.
B. Competitive Environment and Business Strategy;
Table 4-9 shows the zero-order correlation coef­
ficients of industry structure and organizational strategy 
measures. As predicted by proposition 1-5, strategic 
postures that firms assume, are related to the competitive 
structure of their environment. Apparently, the more 
characteristics of a company's industry resemble an 
oligopoly the more the non-price components of its stra­
tegy (marketing and product promotion activities in 
particular) are emphasized. This finding is, of course, 
in line with 10 theories of competitive conduct (Caves, 
1972; Scherer, 1980), and is reflected in the significant 
and positive correlation of the perceived importance of 
the product promotion activities with industry con­
centration ratios, product differentiation and scale eco­
nomy barriers to entry.
















R & D/Sales 0.02694 0.04379 0.00272 0.11366 -0.22672 0.35329**
Advertising/Sales 0.12379 0.05323 0.07454 -0.12828 0.75110*** -0.18602
C. Assets/C. Liabilities 
(Financial Liquidity) 0.00320 -0.01821 -0.07745 -0.00869 0.09423 0.01387
Aaseta/Sales (Capital Intensity) -0.19275 -0.14515 -0.12004 -0.10314 -0.01017 -0.02402
Collection Period (Credit Policy) -0.05521 -0.01736 -0.02839 -0.13171 -0.02773 0.16471
Plant and Equipment Modernization -0.12787 -0.03031 -0.08194 0.02555 0.09005 0.24219*
S Production Capacity Utilization -0.09434 0.05768 0.02746 0.10778 -0.00513 0.06768
PERCEIVED STRATEGY:
Factor 1. Financial Consciousness -0.03724 -0.09331 -0.13496 -0.02996 -0.11089 0.07854
Factor 2. Cuatcmer-Service Based 
Strategy -0.17573 -0.03299 -0.09740 0.05632 -0.25611* 0.07558
Factor 3. Production-Operations 
Expansion -0.10317 0.02175 0.01018 0.07812 -0.19909 0.08286
Factor 4. Promotional Strategies 0.30500** 0.41645*** 0.35640** 0.22273 0.28990** 0.13934
Factor 5. Product Specialization -0.04222 0.11974 0.03848 0.07943 0.10572 0.09002
Factor 6. Risk Reduction Strategies 0.06688 -0.00485 -0.10002 0.03072 -0.08043 0.09132
Factor 7. Market Share Expansion -0.Q207B -0.04267 -0.10236 -0.13772 0.29793** -0.20105
Factor 8. Product Innovation -0.02979 -0,00599 -0.06192 -0.07845 0.08699 -0.09452
Low Price 0.04447 0.04724 0.08252 0.11229 -0.16858 0.29749**
Strateqic Complexity -0.04499 0.00579 -0.10449 0.06279 -0.03107 0.05210
***P <_ 0.001 
**P <_ 0.06 
*P < 0.10
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The correlation matrix also shows that especially 
when industries are characterized by higher product dif­
ferentiation/ companies operating in them claim to place 
less importance on service based strategies, focusing more 
on expansion of their market share. The market share 
strategy, however, is not pursued through competitive 
pricing. Rather, the path followed involves more moni­
toring of the customer needs and tastes, projecting and 
enhancing the appropriate image for the brand, and adver­
tising to increase customer awareness of the products and 
creating customer loyalty for their brand. Such a trend 
is also echoed by the very strong and positive correlation 
of firms' advertising to sales ratio with industry product 
differentiation (r=.75). That is, firms facing a high 
degree of product differentiation in their environment 
allocate a greater percent of their income to their adver­
tising budgets.
The relationship of industry growth with business 
strategy reported in Table 4-9 is interesting, in that, 
while refuting Proposition 1-3, it is consistent with what 
was observed earlier about this variable. Although poten­
tially more profitable, faster growing industries are 
sites of more intense rivalry (Table 4-8). The companies
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in these industries, although, do not perceive price 
rivalry to be prevalent in their environment (see Table 
4-8), they do, however, acknowledge practicing competitive 
pricing as a viable strategic option (r=.30). This pheno­
menon contradicts the thesis shared by many writers, 
including Porter (1980), concerning rivalry in such 
industries. This finding, on the other hand, is predicted 
and justified by Caves (1972). Caves argues that rapid 
growth is likely to induce firms to practice price cutting 
as an attractive strategy that might improve their rela­
tive standing in the market and can ultimately lead to 
greater future profits.
Table 4-9 also reports significant and positive 
correlations for industry growth in relations to firms'
R&D outlet (r=.35), and measure of plant and equipments 
modernization (r«.24). This is explainable in light of 
the positions of companies in their industry life cycle. 
Companies' products and their industries evolve through 
certain stages of development called a life cycle. As Gup 
(19 80) suggests, businesses that are in the pioneering and 
expansion phase of their industry life cycle, are users of 
cash and are characterized by more intense R&D, and plant
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modernization and expansion. Such activities enable them 
to keep up with the diverse and growing demands of their 
market. These businesses are what the Boston Consulting 
Group refers to as "stars" and "wildcats (or Question 
Marks)". The intense fund requirements of these firms is 
probably why, in spite of their higher profitability, they 
are not necessarily financially more liquid. This is, of 
course, evident from the insignificant correlation of the 
firm liquidity ratio with industry growth (see Table 4-8).
Correlations between the intensity and nature of 
rivalry, as perceived by the executives, and firms strate­
gic responses are presented in Table 4-10. The pattern of 
correlations strongly support the plausibility of proposi­
tions 1-5 and 1-6. Specifically, top managements' strate­
gies seem to be related to their perceptions of their 
environmental contingencies. Notice that the largest 
correlation coefficients of the perceived advertising and 
promotional competition in the industry are with firm's 
strategic importance of product promotion (r=0.61) and 
firm's advertising to sales ratio (r=0.48). Apparently, 
when competition is perceived to be of advertising- 
promotional nature, companies generally respond by spe­
cializing in manufacturing of a narrower range of products
Table 4-10. Simple C orre la tions of
Perceived Competitive Environment with S tra tegy
Intensity of Promotional Selling and Quality and Rate of Rate of
Overall and Advertising Distribution Variety Price Product Process
OBJECTIVE STRATEGY: Rivalry_______Competition Competition Competition Competition Innovation Innovation
R & D/Sales 0.1694B -0.06054 -0.29902* 0.09964 -0.01523 0.49183*** 0.28345
Advertising/Sales 0.03832 0.47931*** 0.39095** -0.04918 -0.24608 -0.07954 -0.28854
C. Asaeta/C. Liabilities 
(Financial Liquidity) -0.04237 0.05418 0.00020 -0.09915 -0.22300 0.05618 0.04350
Aasets/Salea (Capital Intensity) -0.06078 -0.32651** -0.15393 0.04646 -0.08476 0.13110 0.18597
Collection Period (Credit Policy) -0.18057 -0.27480* -0.31248** -0.06459 -0.18225 0.15207 0.03694
Plant and Equipment Modernization 0.04271 0.12700 0.18196 -0.15913 -0.24682* 0.11183 0.10231
% Production Capacity Utilization 0.17623 0.16382 0.05367 0.16101 -0.10425 0.17415 0.13961
PERCEIVED STRATEGY!
Factor 1. Financial Consciousness 0.19055 0.00745 -0.15677 0.00584 0.20411 0.15406 0.39367***
Factor 2. Customer-Service Based 
Strategy 0.1597B -0.20389 -0.03003 0.10599 0.07709 0.16715 0.43290***
Factor 3. Production-Operations 
Expansion 0.24222* -0.03956 -0.10197 0.22832 0.36936*** 0.06925 0.30279**
Factor 4. Promotional Strategies 0.18439 0.61007*** 0.19474 -0.03680 -0.25575* 0.00044 0.07141
Factor 5. Product Specialization 0.13522 0.30920** 0.11122 0.06304 -0.17826 0.12085 0.00681
Factor 6. Risk Reduction Strategiea 0.15316 -0.25480* -0.11323 0.32992** 0.26283* 0.17727 0.14247
Factor 7. Market Share Expansion 0.08182 0.13506 0.24145 0.01771 -0.05194 -0.00579 -0.0423B
Factor 8. Product Innovation 0.43108*** -0.11793 -0.12653 0.39119*** 0.23970 0.63269*** 0.40113***
Low Price 0.15750 -0.16968 -0.02B18 0.09055 0.51464*** 0.03217 0.11291
Strateqic Complexity 0.26956* 0.10937 0.12330 0.15694 0.05166 0.15437 0.31968** vo
***P < 0.01 "J
**P T  0.05
*P < 0.10
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(r=0.31), devoting more funds (r=0.48) as well as atten­
tion to advertising for and enhancing of their brand image 
(r=0.61), and adopting a more stringent credit policy 
(r=0.27), probably to improve the cash flow. Companies 
also seem to be less capital intensive, under the 
foregoing environmental condition (r=0.33). This can be 
attributed to PIMS findings regarding these variables 
(Schoeffler et a l ., 1974). The PIMS studies and their 
replications (i.e., Zeithaml et al., 1981) report that 
investment intensity is a hindrance to profitability. But 
this negative relationship is especially stronger with 
higher levels of marketing intensity. Therefore, it can 
be argued that in environments predominantly characterized 
by marketing warfare, companies maintain a lower degree of 
capital intensity to protect their profits. An alter­
native plausible explanation might be that the more firms 
are capital intensive, the less their collective conduct 
(rivalry) revolves around advertising and promotional 
activities which might endanger the profitability of 
everyone.
At any rate, the almost exact opposite strategic 
route is followed by companies when competition is per-
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ceived to be "cut throat” and price related, rather than 
promotional in form. Here, firms tend to reduce the risks 
involved (r=0.26) by monitoring competitors actions and by 
manufacturing a wider range of products, while placing 
more weight on competitive pricing component of their 
strategic package <r=0.51). Two other options are also 
likely to be adopted in order to compensate for the nega­
tive profit impact of the pricing warfare. First, com­
panies might expand their production and operation (r=0.37) 
to enjoy economies of scale and secure in-flow of required 
parts and materials. Secondly, they may downplay the 
costly moves that are of less immediate necessity and have 
negative effects on short run profit picture. For 
example, under such circumstances, plant and equipment 
modernization and promotional activities are likely to be 
overlooked. This is depicted from the negative and 
moderately significant correlations of these two strategic 
actions with perception of price rivalry in the industry 
(r=0,25 and r=0.26, respectively).
Other types of rivalry in the environment and how 
they are reacted to by the businesses are also presented 
in the Table 4-10. For instance, strategic responses to 
more intense selling and distribution competition are
1 0 0
fairly similar to those under promotional and advertising 
competition. Whereas, when rivalry is perceived to 
revolve around the quality and variety of the products, 
companies tend to play along by the use of product innova­
tion (r=0.39).
Moreover, environments that are technologically more 
dynamic, induce companies to stress a more diverse set of 
strategic factors, including financial matters, product 
innovation, expansion of operations, and various customer 
services. As Khandwalla (1976) contends, to the extent 
that technological change threatens a firm with obso­
lescence of its products ad manufacturing processes, it 
should be expected to place a priority on product develop­
ment and its financing to maintain viability. Notice that 
rate of technological change (in processes) and intensity 
of overall rivalry are both positively and significantly 
correlated with firms' strategic complexity (r=0.32 and 
r=0.27, respectively). This finding substantiates 
Khandwalla's conclusion that "A complex environment 
apparently begets a complex and comprehensive corporate 
strategy. A simple environment seems to beget a simple 
corporate strategy centering around only a few activities"
1 0 1
(Khandwalla, 1976: 69). The rationale offered by 
Khandwalla is that rivalry and technological change imply 
uncertainty, dynamism and complexity. And to the extent 
that complex, dynamic environments are richer in con­
tingencies, they would appear to raise the importance of a 
larger number of strategic-type activities. This notion 
is of course at the heart of the concept of requisite 
variety. The law of requisite variety states that "the 
variety within a system must be at least as great as 
environmental variety against which it is attempting to 
regulate itself. Put more succinctly, only variety can 
regulate variety (Buckley, 1968: 495).'*
C. Performance = f (Environment, Strategy):
This section focuses on testing of the proposition 
1-7. The following question is at the heart of this pro­
position. Is the environment-strategy profile of the eco­
nomically successful firms significantly different from 
that of less successful ones? As suggested in chapter 
three, stepwise discriminant analysis was employed to 
tackle this question. This task involved deriving a 
weighted linear combination of the independent variables 
that best discriminate between the two groups of firms.
The linear combination (discriminant function) takes the
1 0 2
following form: D = d]_ + d 2 Z2 + ... + dn Zn .
where D is the discriminant score, the d's are weighting 
coefficients and Z's are the standardized values of the 
discriminating variables. This function is used to deter­
mine whether and how two or more groups differ substan­
tially from one another.
To do so, each subject's (firm's) score on the 
discriminating variables in the model are multiplied by 
their corresponding weights and added together to obtain a 
composite discriminant score. The discriminate scores for 
all subjects (firms) within each particular group are then 
averaged to arrive at group centroids (see, for example, 
Table 4-12). Comparison of the group centroids indicates 
how far apart the groups are along the dimensions being 
tested. Some measure of the distance between the group 
centroids is employed to test for the statistical signifi­
cance of the discriminant function.
Since the variables used in discriminant analysis, 
like in most other multivariate techniques, are preferred 
to be of comparable scales, the scores on all independent 
variables were first standardized. That is, the raw data 
was transformed into variables with a mean of zero and
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standard deviation equal to one.
Next, the SPSS statistical package was used to per­
form the stepwise discriminant procedure. In the stepwise 
method, a variable is considered for selection only if its 
partial multivariate F-ratio is significant at a specified 
level. (The partial F-ratio measures the discrimination 
introduced by the variable after taking into account the 
discrimination achieved by the other selected variables.) 
In addition, variables are tested for removal from the 
model on the basis of their partial F-ratios. For the 
purpose of this study, the required significance level for 
the F-values (pertaining to entry and removal) were spe­
cified to be 0.10 or smaller.
Results derived from the analysis are presented in 
four tables. Table 4-11 summarizes the stepwise process 
of item selection. This table shows the set of variables 
that distinguished the two subsamples of companies, along 
with their partial F-ratios. According to the table, the 
discriminant function after the final step included four 
strategic items (i.e., financial liquidity, capital inten­
sity, capacity utilization, and production-operations 
expansion) and one environmental item (i.e., industry pro­
duct differentiation via advertising). A chi-square test
Thble 4-11. Results of the Stepwise Discriminant Analysis
of Environment and Strategy by Firm Performance
Step
Number
Name of Item Entered 
At Each Step









1 Firm Liquidity Ratio ^ 0.8657720 7.689877 0.0080
2 Industry Product Differentiation 
via Advertising
0.698842 9.696119 0.0003
3 Firm Capital Intensity 0.592185 10.10036 0.0000
4 % Production Capacity Utilized 0.528728 9.581798 0.0000
5 Production-Cperations Expansion 0.474040 9.320023 0.0000
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom Significance Level
32.471 5 0.0000
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of this function's overall discriminating power was signi­
ficant at p < 0.01 level. The results provide support for 
proposition 1-6. Namely, combination of environmental and 
strategic characteristics of high profit organizations are 
significantly different from those of the low profit _ 
companies. The absolute sizes of the partial F-values in 
Table 4-11 shows the relative discriminating power of the 
individual variables (see Hair, 1979: 105). Apparently, 
firm capital intensity and financial liquidity, respec­
tively, are the most and least potent determinations for 
membership to the two subsamples.
Table 4-12 reveals the signs and magnitudes of the 
coefficients associated with the discriminant variables. 
The signs of the coefficients and the group means for the 
items give further insight to the practical implications 
of the findings. They indicate the manner in which 
environments and strategies of the companies associated 
with the two performance levels are different. For 
example, it is shown that high performance companies tend 
to be financially more liquid. This might be so because 
liquidity gives these companies the flexibility to more 
readily take advantage of new profitable opportunities and
Table 4-12. Standard Discriminant Function Coefficients












% Production Capacity Utilized



















Canonical Discriminant Function 
Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)
0.90940 -1.16923
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ventures. Liquidity is also a measure of the margin of 
safety that management maintains in order to allow for the 
inevitable unevenness in the flow of funds through the 
current asset and liability accounts. Liquidity indicates 
the size of the buffer that assures management of being 
able to pay its bills when they come due.
Production capacity utilization is also found to be 
an important contributor to profitability. This is a 
finding also supported by Jauch, Osborn & Glueck (1980) in 
their research. Obviously, while greater capacity utili­
zation reduces fixed costs per unit of products, idle 
capacity undermines efficient use of company investment.
The three remaining discriminant variables seem to be 
negatively related to economic performance. For instance, 
the companies in their high-performance group are less 
capital intensive than those in the low performance group. 
In theory, capital intensiveness is assumed to create 
barriers to competition and thus to be positively asso­
ciated with profit. Empirical tests of the relationship, 
however, have proven controversial. Winn's (1975) study, 
for example, has shown the expected positive relationship. 
Whereas, a PIMS research (Schoeffler et. al., 1974) and 
re-examinations of it (e.g., Zeithaml, 1981) have con­
1 0 8
sistently found a negative association, explaining about 
40 percent of the variation of the profitability of their 
sample businesses. Our data, obviously, corroborates and 
is consistent with the results of the latter group of stu­
dies .
Production capacity utilization is found to be posi­
tively related to profitability. However, attempts to 
expand production and operations apparently have the 
opposite relationship with profitability. Clearly, the 
two results do not pose any inconsistencies. Capacity 
utilization is an index of a company's relative com­
petitive position at the present time. It is therefore 
reflected in the firm's short-run profitability picture.
On the other hand, emphasis on expansion is an attempt to 
enhance one's future position. It is a costly move in the 
short-run, particularly in the period of its implemen­
tation. Its true profit impact can be only revealed in the 
long run, for which longitudinal research is required.
Finally, high performance businesses tend to operate 
in industries associated with relatively lower degrees of 
product differentiation via advertising. This finding 
does not lend support to the 10 theoretical arguments.
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Buzzell and Farris (19 77) who reported results similar to 
those found here offer two possible explanations. First, 
high levels of advertising product differentiation might 
reflect intense competitive rivalries in which profits are 
dissipated. Secondly, this variable may reflect a battle 
for market share among competitors. And as Buzzell, Gale, 
and Sultan (1975: 103) discovered, "expanding share is 
almost always expensive in the short run." The second 
explanation is clearly supported by our results reported 
in Table 4-9 (a significant positive correlation, r=0.30, 
between firms' perceived importance of market share expan­
sion and industry product differentiation via 
advertising).
The last step in the analysis of the data in this 
section is validation of the discriminant function. 
Although the chi-square test presented in Table 4-11 
determines the significance of the discriminant function, 
in reality it is a weak test and means very little (Hair 
et al., 1979: 96-97). So, a classification matrix is 
developed to further evaluate the predictive accuracy of 
the model. By classification, is meant the process of 
classifying the likely group membership of a firm when the 
only information known is the firm's values on the discri­
1 1 0
minating variables. The result of this process is pre­
sented in Table 4-13. The overall "Hit Ratio" (the pro­
portion of firms correctly classified into the two perfor­
mance groups by the function) is a good indicator of the 
discriminating power of the function. However, percent hit 
ratio reported by the SPSS program (in this case 85.42) 
only reflects the success of the function in correctly 
classifying the companies present in the sample. It does 
not show the predictive accuracy of the function in 
classifying similar companies not present in the sample. 
This is so, because an upward bias always occurs if the 
subjects used in developing the classification matrix are 
the same as those used in computing the function (Hair et 
a l ., 1979; Klecka, 19 80). One way to adjust for this 
upward bias, is the "jackknifed classification" option 
available in the BMDP statistical package. This proce­
dure, in fact, creates a rotating "hold out" sample to 
test the predictive accuracy of the discriminant function 
(Jennrich and Sampson. 1979). The jackknifed classifica­
tion using the BMDP program is, thus, presented in Table 
4-14. The hit ratio reported (77.08%) is clearly higher 
than the proportional chance criterion (50.78%). The
Table 4-13. Classification Matrix for the Environment -
Strategy Discriminant Function
Actual Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Number of Cases Low Performance High Performance
Low Performance 27 24 3
88.9% 1 1 .1 %
High Performance 21 4 17
19.0% 81.0%
Total 48 28 20
Hit Ratio (Percent of cases correctly classified): 85.42%
1 1 2
latter item refers to the percent of firm that can be 
classified correctly by chance, and was computed as 
follows (Hair et a l ., 1979: 102):
P.C.C. = P2 + (1 - P )2 = (22) 2 + (21, 2 = 50.78%48 48
Where P = the proportion of firms in high performance
group.
1-P = the proportion of firms in low performance 
group.
In short, the research data supports proposition 1-6 
in that the combination of environmental and strategic 
profile of high performing firms is indeed different from 
that of low performing companies. Putting it differently, 
the external competitive environment and competitive 
strategies followed by companies, both, have significant 
impacts on levels of economic performance realized by 
business enterprises. As such, theoretical and research 
approaches aimed at integration and simultaneous examina­
tion of both of these classes of variables are of great 
predictive and explanatory value. After all, 
understanding, explaining, and predicting is what scien­
tific inquiry is all about (Kerlinger, 1973).
II. ENVIRONMENT - STRUCTURE- PERFORMANCE:
The Analysis of this set of relationships will begin






Low Performance High Performance
Low Performance 27 21 6
77.8% 22.2%
High Performance 21 5 16
23.8% 76.2%
Total 48 26 22
Hit Ratio (Percent of cases correctly classified): 77.08%
Proportional chance criterion: _____ ______________________________ 50.78%
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with inspecting the manner in which certain structural 
dimensions of the sample companies are associated with the 
external environments of the firms. This will be then 
followed by a normative study of the combination of orga­
nizational and environmental characteristics that best 
discriminate between high and low performance firms.
A. Organization Structure and Competitive Environment;
This section is concerned with testing of the propo­
sitions II-1 through II-5, formulated in Chapter Two. 
Specifically, it entails examining the relationships of 
selected internal structural characteristics of organiza­
tions with the competitive contingencies of their external 
environment. Of particular interest and importance will 
be the environmental sources of intra-organizational power 
distribution.
According to Proposition Il-l, the more intense 
overall rivalry is in a firm's industry, the higher 
will be the organization's decentralization, autonomy, and 
delegation of authority by the CEO. Based on the correla­
tions of variables reported in Table 4-15, neither the 
intensity of overall rivalry nor the degree of different
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forms of rivalry are found to be associated with organiza­
tional decentralization. Instead, the Table indicates 
that both overall decentralization of decision making and 
decentralization of some specific types of decisions are 
strongly related to objective structural dimensions of the 
competitive environment. In fact, 11 of the 24 correla­
tions between industry structure variables and different 
decentralization variables are statistically significant 
at the P _< .10 level. Index of decentralization of 
marketing decisions is apparently statistically indepen­
dent of all the industry structure dimensions considered. 
The remaining three of the four decentralization indices 
are, however, shown to be positively correlated with 
measures of industry concentration and barriers to entry. 
Of the 28 correlations relating various perceived forms of 
rivalry with aspects of organizational decentralization, 
only one is statistically significant.
Two important implications seem to emerge from the 
foregoing results. First decentralization is more 
strongly associated with the salient structural charac­
teristics of the industry than with the perceived beha­
vioral characteristics of the competitive environment. 
Organization theorists' exclusive focus on the managerial
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perceptions of rivalry, hence, may have contributed to 
their inconsistent and contradictory results concerning 
the effect of competition on decentralization (see for 
example, Khandwalla, 19 73; and Pfeffer and Leblebici, 
1973). The following paragraphs are an attempt to 
explain, from a conceptual standpoint, the rather strong 
association between industry competitive structure and 
organizational decentralization, as demonstrated in the 
present research.
Competition always involves uncertainty, especially 
in highly fragmented industries (low concentration and 
entry barriers). Uncertainty alone, however, is not as 
critical and problematic as when it is combined with 
dependence (Aldrich, 1979: Ch. 3). Lower concentration
and entry barriers signal presence of a larger number of 
existing and potential competitors, and greater likelihood 
of lack of market leaders to be in tuned with and depend 
upon. As such, according to Caves (1977), the individual 
sellers react mainly to impersonal market forces. The 
lack of dependence gives organizations increased freedom 
in their operations. The situation does require a certain 
amount of attention to competition but not as much as when
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concentration and entry barriers are higher. Under the 
latter conditions, rivalry is among fewer firms. These 
firms are more likely to recognize the impact of their 
actions on their rivals, and vice versa. Greater possibi­
lity exists for retaliations and efforts to counter one 
another's moves. As such, firms react to one another in a 
more direct and personal fashion (Caves, 1977). That is 
to say that firms are mutually interdependent. As Aldrich 
(19 79: Ch. 5) argues, however, the effect of competitive 
uncertainty is most strongly felt when it is combined with 
dependence. The greater decentralization in more oligopo­
listic environments, therefore, could well be a response 
to the simultaneous presence of both uncertainty and 
dependence in such environments.
The second implication of the results is a confir­
mation of the Grinyer et al.'s (1980) finding that 
treating decentralization as a unidimensional variable is 
misleading and might obscure important relationships. 
Therefore, exploring the variation patterns of specific 
forms of decentralization under different conditions, as 
performed here and by Grinyer et al. (19 80), is of merit 
and advisable for future research.
With respect to expected relationship between auto­
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nomy and rivalry, the data fails to support the research 
proposition. This, of course, does not necessarily reject 
the plausibility of the hypothesized relationship. In 
fact, autonomy does not show significant correlations with 
any of the environmental variables. The explanation is 
obvious from the descriptive statistics on the variable 
(see the Appendix). With 9-23 as the possible range for 
the autonomy measure, the mean value and standard 
deviation for the companies in the sample are 20.67 and 
2.86, respectively. Clearly, the very little variation in 
the autonomy values does not lend itself to testing the 
proposed relationship. Therefore, the research fails to 
reject or to confirm the plausibility of a positive asso­
ciation between overall rivalry and organizational auto­
nomy.
As predicted, Table 4-15 shows a positive correlation 
between CEO delegation and perceived intensity of overall 
rivalry in the industry (r=.25). Environments charac­
terized by more intense rivalry frequently require execu­
tives to make timely decisions, and act promptly, in 
response to the plans and conducts of their competitors. 
Firms' more flexible and decentralized top management is
1 2 0
likely to be a sign of their CEO's appreciation of such 
environmental requirements.
Propositions II-2 through II-5 entail the environmen­
tal sources of power distribution in organizations. 
Organizations, as Hickson et a l . (1971: 217) suggest,
can be "conceived of as interdepartmental systems in which 
a major task element is coping with uncertainty." 
Uncertainty coping is a critical task in part because it 
permits the rationalization of organizational activities, 
while at the same time keeping organizations adaptive to 
external constraints (Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1973).
As such, the power of organizational units is expected to 
be fundamentally determined by the importance of the 
units' activities in reducing the major uncertainties 
facing the organization. Table 4-15 includes the coef­
ficients of correlations of organizational units' 
influence with behavioral and structural characteristics 
of their competitive environment.
Proposition II-2 stated that in industries whose 
dominant environmental requirements center on product dif­
ferentiation and market development, the power accrued to 
the functional unit(s) in charge of coping with the output 
task (i.e., Marketing & Sales) will be greater. In support
1 2 1
of this proposition, influence of sales and marketing 
functions had a significant correlation of r=0.31 with 
advertising product differentiation. However, the former 
variable did not display strong and significant 
relationships with either of the two forms of marketing 
rivalry in the industry (i.e., promotional/advertising or 
selling/distribution). From this, it might appear that 
Proposition II-2 regarding power of sales and marketing 
units has not received strong support from the data. 
However, a look at the sample mean of sales and marketing 
influence (see the Appendix) may prove otherwise. 
Considering that this variable was measured on a scale of 
0 to 5, the very large sample mean of 4.37 suggests that 
the values of this 'variable are almost indiscriminately 
high. That is, the item values vary too little (Std.
Dev. = 0.64) to permit any significant correlations with 
most other variables.
Data from other similar studies involving manufac­
turing companies also indicate that these firms are 
overwhelmingly dominated by their sales and marketing 
departments (Perrow, 1971; Miles and Snow, 19 78: Chapter
12). Perrow (1971) argues that since manufacturing firms
1 2 2
must sell their products and since customers "determine 
the cost, quality, and type of goods that will be produced 
and distributed," the customer determines the success of 
these organizations. While all departments in these orga­
nizations contribute to customer satisfaction, it is sales 
that is the main gate between the firm and its customers.
"As gatekeeper, it determines how important will 
be prompt delivery, quality, product- 
improvement, or new products, and the cost at 
which goods can be sold. Sales determines the 
relative importance of these variables for the 
other groups and indicates the values which 
these variables will take.... As the link bet­
ween the customer and producer, it absorbs most 
of the uncertainty about the diffuse and 
changing environment of customers (Perrow, 19 71:
65 ). "
Perrow (19 71) proceeds to conclude that, sales as the most 
critical function in manufacturing companies, therefore, 
tends to have the most power.
The above explanation together with the negative 
correlations of engineering influence with promotional and 
distributional forms of rivalry (r=-0.35 and r=-0.26, 
respectively) offer the following conclusion. While sales 
and marketing unit is highly influential in most 
situations, engineering loses its power base when the 
extraorganizational rivalry becomes predominantly 
marketing oriented.
123
Proposition II-3 stated that the power of tech­
nocratic units increase as rivalry in the industry becomes 
more product related. The data offers limited support for 
this proposition. Correlations of product rivalry with 
influence of all major functional units are consistently 
positive. However, except for the case of financially 
oriented units, the size of correlation coefficients are 
moderate though statistically non-significant.
Apparently, in companies faced with greater product 
rivalry, every major functional area tends to exert 
somewhat more influence on decisions of strategic 
importance.
Based on Proposition II-4, price competition should 
be positively related to power of production and financial 
units. The proposition is strongly supported with respect 
to the production unit (r=0.38) and moderately, though 
not significantly, for the financial units (r=0.17). So, 
as firms confront more intense price competition {with 
external requirement for efficiency and cost control), the 
power of units that cope with the throughput task 
increases.
Finally, this study also finds strong support for
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proposition II-5. As expected, in companies faced with 
greater environmental requirement for technological deve­
lopments and innovations, the functional unit primarily 
involved in new product/process development (i.e., R & D 
department) possesses more power and is more influential. 
This is evidenced by the strong correlations of R & D 
influence with the rates of product and process innova­
tions in the industry (r=0.33 and r=0.37, respectively).
In short, the findings of this research are con­
sistent with the tenets of the strategic contingency 
theory of power, as outlined by prominent organization 
theorists (e.g., Hickson et al., 1971; Salancik and 
Pfeffer, 1977; and Pfeffer, 1981). The findings also 
parallel the observations of the researchers who have in 
general provided support for the theory (e.g., Crozier, 
1964; Hinings, 1974; Hambick, 1980; Hrebiniak and Snow, 
1980; and Salancik, Pfeffer and Kelly, 1978). The major 
thrusts of the underlying theory and findings of this 
study so perfectly outlined by Salancik et al., (1978: 
253), are as follows:
"The influence of a subunit or an individual on 
a decision is a function of 1 ) the kind of 
uncertainty faced by an organization, 2 ) the 
particular characteristic or capability which 
enables reducing organizational uncertainty, and
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3 ) the degree to which a particular subunit 
possesses this characteristic. As decision­
making contexts vary, so do the sources of orga­
nizational uncertainty, and consequently, the 
bases for influence in organizational decision 
making (Salancik, et al., 1978: 253)."
B. Performance = f (Environment, Organization Structure): 
This section focuses on testing on the Proposition
II-6 . The proposition states that combination of environ­
mental and organizational characteristics associated with 
high performing firms is significantly different from that 
associated with low performing companies. That is, mem­
bership of the companies in the high or low performance 
groups can be largely determined by their environmental- 
organizational profiles. As suggested in Chapter Three, 
stepwise discriminant analysis was employed to verify the 
plausibility of this statement. The task involved 
deriving a weighted linear combination of the variables 
discriminating the two groups. Since the independent 
variables involved were not measured on comparable scales, 
the values of these variables were first standardized. 
Namely, the raw data was transformed to have means of 
zero and standard deviations equal to one. Then the SPSS 
statistical package was used to perform the stepwise 
discriminant procedure. The required significance level
1 2 6
of the partial F-ratios for entry to or removal from the 
model were specified to be P <_ 0.10. The results derived 
from the analysis are presented in three tables. Table 
4-16 summarizes the stepwise process of item selection.
It shows the set of variables that distinguished the two 
subsamples of companies, along with their corresponding F- 
ratios. According to Tables 4-16 and 4-17, the discrimi­
nant function after the final step consisted of a linear 
combination of two environmental and three organization 
structure variables, as follows:
D = -0.82810Z1 + 0.75942Z2 + 0.65939Z3 
-0.71577Z4 + 0.49603 Z5 
Where Z^ = Industry Advertising Product Differentiation,
Z2 = Perceived Promotional Rivalry in the Industry, 
Z3 = R & D Influence,
Z4 = Finance and Accounting Influence, 
and Z5 = Formalization.
The Chi-Square test of the function's overall discri­
minating power is statistically significant (at P=0.000 
level). The result, therefore, offers strong support for 
Proposition II-6 . The performance level of the sample 
companies is indeed a function of both competitive 
environment and organization structure.
Table 4-16. Results of the Stepwise Discriminant




Name of Item Entered 
at Each Step
Name of Item 







1 Industry Product Differentiation 
via Advertising
0.870418 6.848169 0.0120
2 Perceived Promotional Competition 0.769759 6.729940 0.0028
3 R & D Influence 0.657352 7.645057 0.0003
4 Finance and Accounting Influence 0.563412 8.330179 0.0000
5 Formlization 0.512784 7.981161 0.0000
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom Significance Level
29.054 5 0.0000
Table 4-17. Standard Discriminant Function Coefficients











via Advertising (Industry Adv. Intensity)
Perceived Promotional Competition
R & D Influence

















Canonical Discriminant Function 
Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids) -0.84155 1.08199
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Table 4-17 also gives further insight to the prac­
tical implications of the results. It demonstrates the 
manner in which environment and organization structure of 
the companies in the two performance categories are dif­
ferent. For example, the signs of the discriminant func­
tion coefficients and the variable means for the two 
groups suggest that higher industry product differen­
tiation (measured by industry adve tising intensity) is 
associated with the low performance companies. However, 
companies in the high performance category tend to operate 
in industries characterized by higher promotional rivalry. 
This outcome is consistent with the earlier findings in 
sections I-A and I-C of this chapter. The explanation for 
the result is also offered in the foregoing sections (see 
pages 90 and 108), and thus not repeated here.
Of the internal structural characteristics of the 
firms, two dimensions of the organizational power struc­
ture, as well as the degree of impersonal bureaucratic 
controls have emerged as powerful discriminants. R and D 
departments portrayed a greater degree of influence on 
matters of strategic importance in the high performing 
companies. On the other hand, Financial and Accounting
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units seem to have more say in the strategic decisions of 
the low performing businesses'.
With respect to formalization, higher values of this 
variable are related to economically more successful firms 
in the sample. Apparently a "tighter ship" was needed for 
the sample companies to achieve high levels of profitabi­
lity. This is, of course, what Horovitz and Thietart 
(1982) also discovered for the diversified companies 
studied in their research.
The next step of the analysis required at this stage 
is to further validate the derived discriminant function. 
Table 4-18 shows the related classification matrix 
constructed and used for this purpose. Obviously, the 
derived function proves to be quite reliable to the extent 
that it correctly classifies about 87 percent of the 
sample firms into their proper performance group. The 87 
percent "hit ratio," however, is only an indicator of the 
internal validity of the results. This ratio must be 
adjusted downward if it is to be used in assessing the 
external validity of the findings (Hair et al., 1979; 
Klecka, 1980). The output of the discriminant-analysis 
routine of the BMDP statistical program, reflecting the 
required adjustment, is presented in Table 4-19. The hit
Table 4-18. Classification Matrix for
the Environment-Structure Discriminant Function
Actual Number Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group of Cases Low Performance High Performance
Low Performance 27 25 2
92.6% 7.4%
High Performance 21 4 17
19.0% 81.0%
Total 48 29 19
Percent of cases classified correctly {Hit Ratio): 87.50
Table 4-19. Jackknifed Classification for
the Environment-Structure Discriminant Function
Actual Number Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group of Cases Low Performance High Performance
Low Performance 27 24 3
46.25% 88.9% 1 1 .1 %
High Performance 21 5 16
43.75% 23.8% 76.2%
Total 48 29 19
Hit Ratio (Percent of cases correctly classified): 83.33%
Proportional Chance Criterion: 50.78%
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ratio produced by the BMDP's "jackknifed classification" 
procedure is 83 percent. This is clearly and signifi­
cantly higher than the "proportional chance criterion" of 
50.78 percent* (Hair et al., 1979). The result, there­
fore, provides sufficient evidence for the strong predic­
tive accuracy of the discriminant model constructed in 
this section.
In summary, the research data gives strong support to 
Proposition II-6 . As predicted, combination of environ­
mental and organizational profile of high performing firms 
is indeed different from that of low performing companies. 
The external competitive environment and internal struc­
ture of organizations, both, have significant impact on 
levels of economic performance realized by businesses.
This finding, furthermore, substantiates the call for 
integrative research models that incorporate concepts from 
industrial organization economics into the main stream 
organization theory paradigm, in pursuit of explaining 
business performance.
*See section I (Page 111) of this chapter for explana­
tion and computation of this value.
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The finding also has important implications con­
cerning the two environmental variables in the final 
discriminant model (function). Of the two, advertising 
product differentiation has been objectively measured and 
reflects a structural characteristic of the competitive 
environment (industry). The other variable (i.e., per­
ceived promotional rivalry), on the other hand, is a per­
ceptual measure indicative of the predominant mode of con­
duct in the industry. As such, the latter variable repre­
sents a behavioral dimension of the competitive arena.
The first implication of the above paragraph is that, 
in analysis of business performance, objective environmen­
tal measures have explanatory power above and beyond that 
of perceptual measures. Reliance on multiple sources of 
data and modes of measurement, therefore, should enhance 
the explanatory and predictive power of the analytic 
models used by researchers.
The second implication is that, both, structural as 
well as behavioral dimensions of the competitive environ­
ment seem to be important and potentially powerful in ana­
lysis of the profitability of business enterprises. Many 
management researchers unfortunately fail to make distinc­
tion between the two, and consequently adopt simplified
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and unidimensional concepts of competition (e.g., Neghandi 
and Prasad, 19 71; Pfeffer and Leblebici, 19 73). Such 
simplifications usually produce imcomplete and less than 
adequate representations of the reality, and should be 
guarded against.
III. STRATEGY - STRUCTURE - PERFORMANCE;
The analysis of this set of relationships will begin 
with examining the manner in which certain structural dimen­
sions of the sample companies are associated with their com­
petitive strategies. This will be then followed by a nor­
mative study of the combination of the firms' strategic and 
structural characteristics that best discriminate between 
high and low performance firms.
A. Competitive Strategy and Organization Structure:
The view that strategy guides the choice of organiza­
tion structure was first explored by Chandler (1962). But 
this notion has been accepted within the management 
discipline as an article of faith even though very narrow 
interpretation of the concepts of strategy and structure 
were used by Chandler and others following his line of 
research (e.g., Wrigley, 1970; Rumelt, 1974; Pavan, 1976).
In their view, strategy i3 seen in terms of a firm's
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corporate diversification strategy, and structure as the 
organization’s functional configuration.
Fortunately, interest in the business competitive 
strategy and its relation to a more complete concept of 
structure has increased over the past several years (Miles 
and Snow, 1978; Montanari, 1979; Miller and Friesen,
1980). It is now becoming clear that a given business 
strategy is best served by certain internal .organizational 
patterns that not only support the existing strategy but 
also tend to perpetuate it (Child, 1972; Miles and Snow, 
1978; Bourgeois and Astley, 1979). The overwhelming con­
sensus remains that strategic decisions take on meaning 
only as they are implemented through organization's struc­
ture and processes. Structure is, therefore, conceived of 
as a mechanism designed to facilitate strategy implemen­
tation.
The position assumed and defended in this section of 
the dissertation is that it is possible to characterize 
business organizations based on their strategic orientations 
and to predict with some reliability the structural attri­
butes associated with a chosen strategy. Research proposi­
tions III-l through III-4, advanced in Chapter Two, reflect
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this theoretical position. Table 4-20 shows the correlation 
coefficients that bear upon these propositions.
As predicted in proposition III-l, the more emphasis 
the companies place on their financial status in coping with 
the environment, the more influence their production and 
financially oriented units will haye in strategy formulation 
and deliberation processes (r = 0.53 and r = 0.28, 
respectively). Consistent with this set of correlations is 
also the negative and significant relationship of financial 
liquidity with the power of the foregoing units (r = -0.24 
and r = -0.25). As one might expect, when companies 
experience more hardship due to lower financial liquidity, 
more influence i3 accrued to those units that are in the 
position to monitor and/or deal with such a strategic 
contingency.
The results discussed above confirm proposition III-l 
and are in line with the conclusions reached by Miles and 
Snow (1978) and Hambrick (19 80) in their multi-industry stu­
dies. Miles and Snow (19 78) have developed a typology of 
firms' competitive strategies. In their typology, Defenders 
are the companies that compete primarily by efficiently 
serving a stable domain. Their strategic emphasis is on 
excelling at the throughout task and improving cost

























RAD/Sales 0.11248 -0*01010 0.36533** 0.45730*** -0.13579 0.02607 0.25935 0.27315 0.22573 0.05216 -0.01551 0.11670 0.01182
Ad ve rt 1 s 1ng/Sa1 os 0.29924* -0.5220 -0.13421 0.11132 -0.10042 -0,12858 0.18648 0,00667 -0*12833 -0.00712 -0.02572 0.04760 0.10992
C. Assets/C* Liabilities 
(Financial Liquidity)
-0.12465 -0.23665* -0.00IBB 0.19127 -0.24576* -0.13721 0.07260 0.07344 0.19901 -0.32100*“ -0.26122* -0,35495*" -0.17377
Assets/Sales (Capital Intensity) -0.13613 -0.18218 0.14729 0.09989 -0.05471 -0.12347 -0.23046 0,09402 0.44854*"* -0.10191 -0.11232 -0.04430 -0.02302
Collection Period (Credit Pol Icy) 0.09450 -0.10327 0.28456** 0.1Z234 0.12108 -0.04652 -0.17649 0.20B98 0.22398 0.06463 0.06023 0.11909 -0.09200
Plant and Equipment Modernization 0.09753 0.10634 0.31484** 0.15533 -0.08630 0.12816 -0.06422 0.04778 0.03924 -0.13898 -0.14409 -0.12821 -0.06216
S Production Capacity Utilization -0.04595 0.06249 0.35390** 0.21533 0.00446 0.20689 -0.13312 G.06B26 -0,00802 -0.16907 -0.13635 -0.14041 -0.15763
PERCEIVED STRATEGY:
FACTOR 1. Financial Consciousness -0.04064 0.52752*** 0.09454 0.12228 0.28481* 0.29054** -0,13832 0.21590 -0.13109 0.13217 0,17313 0.06979 0,12720
FACTOR 2, Custcmer-servlce-based strategies -0.01464 0.30731** 0.23227 0.10245 0,33881** 0.28450* -0.19076 0.12365 0.08938 0.21702 0.20240 0.16006 0.08286
FACTOR 3. Productlon-Operatlons Expansion -0.25758* 0.43098*** 0.33665** 0.10074 0.25724" 0.27215* -0.06979 -0.12097 0.05291 0.09812 0.16563 -0.06830 -0.01739
FACTOR 4 . Promotional Strategies 0.06432 0.06457 -0.19278 -0.13853 0.13179 0,20148 0.18819 0,08124 -0.18428 0.13757 0.14650 0.19892 0.10462
FACTOR 5, Product Specialization 0.27700* -0.12052 -0.02217 0.04737 -0.11739 0.25432* 0.16922 0.03202 -0.01687 -0.16823 -0.17319 -0.01124 -0.23781
FACTOR 6. Risk Reduction Strategies 0.31090** 0,25920* -0.00927 0.04295 0.20830 0.04365 0.11266 0,28518* -0.16659 0,23592 0.17515 0.27898* 0.17700
FACTOR 7, Market Share Expansion 0.45785*** 0.26583* -0.06340 0.10466 0.10077 0,14641 0.07540 0,10742 -0.28908** -0.21470 -0.20100 -0.05579 -0.22535
FACTOR 8* Product Innovation -0.03090 0.32755** 0.39437*** 0,55823*** 0.20144 0.15182 -0.13638 0.30236*■ 0.26012* 0,01651 0.0546? -0.09150 -0,07532
Low Prl oe 0.23091 0.04117 -0.02184 -0.17626 -0.02960 -0,20124 0.01867 0.04351 -0.07032 0.059IB -0.00340 -0.04097 0.28052"
Strategic Comp laxity 0.27617* 0.21561 0.22578 0.03739 0,14500 0.38375*** -0.06200 0.28277* -0.07029* -0.02356 -0.09692 0.18136 -0.02427
I—1••■p <_o.oi
** p <_ 0.05 CO
• P <0.10
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efficiency. Therefore, consistent with their requirements 
for strategic success, Defenders' financial and production 
experts yield considerable power in the firms' dominant 
coalitions (Miles and Snow, 1978; Hambrick, 1980).
According to table 4-20, the correlations of Financial 
Consciousness (emphasis on financial factors) with the four 
measures of decentralization are all positive, though not 
statistically significant. Financial Consciousness also has 
a significant positive relationship with CEO Delegation (r = 
0.29). These results, thus, fail to support the hypothesis 
that greater emphasis on financial factors is associated 
with more 'mechanistically designed organization structures. 
Moreover, table 4-20 shows another set of interesting rela­
tionships with respect to financial liquidity and measures 
of decentralization. All four of the correlation coef­
ficients be.tween these two sets of variables are negative, 
and three are also statistically significant. The implica­
tion of these results is contrary to what some organization 
theorists content. Ernest Dale (1967), for example, 
believes that in times of economic hardship, decision prero­
gatives become more centralized and company managers place 
staff under close scrutiny to avoid costly duplication of
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functions. The findings of this research, on the other 
hand, suggest that companies faced with lower financial 
liquidity capitalize on such advantages of decentralization 
as unburdening of top managers, faster decision making, and 
improved decisions by making them closer to the scene of 
action.
In sum, support for proposition III-l was mixed. The 
data did show that greater power of financial and production 
units was in fact strongly associated with greater financial 
consciousness of company strategists. On the other hand, 
the assertion that companies with greater emphasis on finan­
cial factors would be more mechanistically structured was 
not confirmed.
Proposition II-2 posits that the more emphasis a com­
pany places on product development and R & D activities, the 
more its internal structure would become organic, and the 
greater will be the power its technocratic and management 
science oriented units. No support is given to the first 
part of this proposition by the data. If anything, product 
innovation strategy appears to be associated with greater 
formalization of activities (r = 0.30) and larger CEO span 
of management, i.e., differentiation at the top of the orga­
nizational echelon (r = 0.26). The second part of the
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proposition, however, receives strong backing from the data. 
Product innovation is significantly correlated, in the pre­
dicted direction, with the power of production, engineering, 
and most of all, R & D units (r * 0.33, r = 0.39, and r = 
0.56, respectively). The trend is further echoed by the 
strong positive correlation of the objective measure of 
firms' R & D intensity (i.e., R & D expenses/sales) with the 
amount of influence accrued to engineering and R & D depart­
ments (r = 0.37 and r = 0.46, respectively).
The above results are strikingly similar to those of 
Miles and Snow (1978) and Hambrick (1980). In the context 
of their undertakings, the label "Prospector" describes an 
organization that competes primarily by engaging in substan­
tial new product (and market) development, but pays relati­
vely little attention to cost efficiency. The strategic 
requirement for success of such companies is "to attend to 
the output task— monitoring and adjusting products and 
markets (Hambrick, 1980:7)". As such, consistent with the 
strategic contingencies facing them, their executives' 
involvement in the product and market development functions 
were found to be positively associated with power (Miles and 
Snow, 1978; Hambrick, 1980). In general, therefore, a more
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product innovation and R & D intensive strategic theme is 
indeed associated with greater power of technocratic and 
management science oriented organizational subunits.
Proposition III - 3 postulates that greater reliance on 
marketing and promotional strategies would go hand-in-hand 
with more influential marketing oriented functions. In sup­
port of this proposition, sales and marketing's power do 
show a significant and positive relationship with the objec­
tive measure of emphasis on marketing and promotional 
efforts; i.e., advertising expenses/sales (r = 0.30).
However, the former variable does not correlate with the 
perceptual measure of the same activities. These mixed 
results become even more confusing when one notes the signi­
ficant and positive relationships of the sales and marketing 
influence with other types of perceived strategies, such as 
product specialization (r = 0.31) and market share expansion 
(r = 0.46). The source of such inconsistencies mainly lies 
in a characteristic of the data that was also noted in 
section II-A (page 120) of this chapter. That is, the sample 
mean value for influence of marketing and sales, measured on 
a scale of zero to five, amounts to 4.37. As such, there is 
very little variation in the value of this variable. As a 
result, the patterns of correlations involving this variable
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do not mean much and should be viewed very cautiously. 
Moreover, it also means that verifying the plausibility of 
proposition III-3 on the basis of the existing data is 
problematic. A safe conclusion, however, can be drawn, con­
cerning the extent of the influence of sales and marketing, 
using the present data. That is that these units are almost 
indiscriminantly highly influential in the strategy formula­
tion and deliberation processes of the companies that they 
are a part of. This conclusion is, of course, a reaffirma­
tion of the findings of the similar studies on manufacturing 
firms* (e.g., Perrow, 1971, Miles and Snow, 1978: ch. 12).
Proposition III-4 states the more strategy emphasizes 
proliferation of a wider range of products, the wider will 
be the CEO's span of management and the more decentralized 
will be the company's structure. To test this proposi­
tion, one has to refer to the result of the factor analy­
tic procedure that was applied to the measure of 
companies' perceived strategies (see pages 71-77).
Notice that in the final factor solutions, firm's emphasis
*See section II-A, page 121, of this manuscript for an 
explanation offered by Perror (1971).
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on "wide product range" emerged as one component of a broad 
and diverse strategic package, labeled as "Factor 6 Risk 
Reduction Strategies" (see Table 4-5, page 76). According 
to Table 4-20, the correlation coefficient between Factor 6 
and CEO span (r = -0.17) does not seem to confirm proposi­
tion III-4. However, recall that Factor 6 is composed of 
such very diversified strategic dimensions as emphasis on a 
wide product range, monitoring and predicting competitors' 
actions, and mergers (Table 4-5, page 76). Whereas proposi­
tion III-4 is exclusively concerned with the first of the 
above mentioned strategic dimension; namely, proliferation 
of a wide product range. As such, an exclusive examination 
of this particular strategic attribute, as it relates to CEO 
span and structural decentralization is clearly necessary. 
The correlation coefficients obtained from such a more per­
tinent analysis is as follows:
CEO Decentra- Dec. of Dec. of Dec. of
Span lization Operative Marketing Production
Wide
Product 0.26* 0.28* 0.24* 0.18* 0.17*
Range
*P _< 0.10
It is obvious from these results that the data does in fact 
provide support for proposition III-4.
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In sum, therefore, the present research reaffirms the 
prevalent position with regards to the interdependence of 
strategy and structure. More specifically, the notion of 
"structure follows strategy" appears to be tentatively 
generalizable to the previously neglected concepts of 
business unit strategy and organization's bureaucratic 
attributes.
A word of caution concerning the analyses and discus­
sions presented above is in order. That is, neither the 
cross sectional data used, nor the statistical mode of 
analysis employed in this section allow any causal 
interpretation of the results. Hence, ,any such inferences 
on the basis of this research may only be viewed as ten­
tatively plausible explanations. The importance of this 
limitation is realized when one notes that for many of the 
statistically significant relationships found, two com­
pletely different scenarios based on opposite causal direc­
tions can be constructed (Child, 1972). For instance, on 
the one hand, a subunit's power may be a reflection of the 
company's current strategic direction. On the other hand, 
the current strategy may be reflection of the present or 
an earlier power pattern in the dominant coalition 
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977; Hambrick, 1980).
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As important as the issue of cause and effect rela­
tionships is, a more detailed and precise analysis of it is 
outside the scope of this project.
B. Performance = f (strategy, organization structure);
This section focuses on testing of the proposition III-5.
The following question is at the heart of this proposition.
Is the strategy-structure profile of the economically success­
ful firms significantly different from that of their less 
successful counterparts? That is, can membership of the com­
panies to the high and low performance groups be largely 
predicted on the basis of their strategic and structural 
characteristics? Stepwise discriminant analysis was used to 
tackle this question. Specifically, the stepwise discrimi­
nant procedure of the SPSS progam was applied to the stan­
dardized values of the structural and strategic variables 
(and factor scores). The significance level of the F-ratios 
for items' entry to and removal from the model was specified to be 
P _< 0.10. The results are presented in three tables. Based 
on Tables 4-21 and 4-22, the discriminant function after the 
final step consists of a linear combination of two strategic 
and four structural variables, as follows:
D = 0.668132g - 0.6647522 + 0.9176023 - 1.1089624 +
0.7787125 - 0.5724926
TSble 4-21. Results of the Stepwise Discriminant




Name of Item Entered 
at Each Step
Name of Item 







1 Firm Liquidity Ratio 0.856772 7.689877 0.0080
2 Firm Capital Intensity 0.760476 7.086733 0.0021
3 Formlization 0.660217 7.548267 0.0004
4 Finance and Accounting Influence 0.577086 7.878077 0.0001
5 Production Influence 0.516699 7.857046 0.0000
6 Sales and Marketinq Influence 0.439143 8.727279 0.0000
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom Significance Level
35.386 6 0.0000
Table 4-22. Standard Discriminant Function







Mean for Each Performance 
Group
Low High
Firm Liquidity Ratio 
Firm Capital Intensity 
Formali zation
Finance and Accounting Influence
Production Influence



















Canonical Discriminant Function 
Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids) -0.97568 1.25445
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Where = Firm Financial Liquidity Ratio (current assets/ 
c. liabilities),
Z2 = Firm Capital Intensity (Assets/Sales),
Z3 = Formalization,
Z4 = Finance and Accounting Influence,
Z5 = Production Influence, and 
Zg = Sales and Marketing Influence.
The Chi-Square test of the function's overall discrimi­
nating power is statistically significant (at P = 0.001 
level). Additional insight may be gained from table 4-21 
with regards to the manner in which the strategic and struc­
tural makeup of the companies in the two performance cate­
gories are different. For example, the signs of discrimi­
nant function coefficients and the item means for the two 
groups suggest that higher financial liquidity and lower 
capital intensity are associated with high performance com­
panies. This is precisely what was concluded in an earlier 
section of this chapter (section I-C, Page 105).
Furthermore, as it was discussed in that earlier section, 
this finding also correlates the results of a number of 
other empirical studies (e.g. Schoeffler et al., 1974; 
Zeithaml et al., 1981).
Of the internal structural characteristics of the firms,
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here again like in section I-C, the degree of impersonal 
bureaucratic controls (formalization) and the top manage­
ment's power structure have emerged as the strongest discri­
minants. Specifically, higher values of the formalization 
variable are related to achievement of high levels of profi­
tability. Also, production departments seem to portray a 
greater degree of influence on matters of strategic impor­
tance in the high performance companies. Whereas, the 
financially oriented subunits apparently have more say in 
the strategic decisions of the low performing businesses.
At any rate, the discriminant function derived correctly 
classifies about 85 percent of the sample firms into their 
proper performance groups (see table 4-23). This "hit 
ratio" needs to be adjusted downward to assess the external 
validity of the model (Hair et al., 1979; Klecka, 1980).
The adjusted hit ratio produced by the "Jackknifed 
Classification" procedure of the BMDP program is presented 
in table 4-24. The adjusted hit ratio of 79 percent is 
clearly and significantly larger than the "proportional 
chance criterion" of 50.78 percent* (Hair et a l ., 1979).
*See section I (Page 111) of this chapter for explana­
tion and computation of this value.
Table 4-23. Classification Matrix for
the Strategy-Structure Discriminant Function
Actual Number Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group of Cases Low Performance High Performance
Low Performance 27 24 3
88.9% 1 1 .1 %
High Performance 21 4 17
19.0% 81.0%
Total 48 28 20
Hit Ratio (Percent of cases classified correctly): 85.42%
Table 4-24. Jackknifed Classification for the
Strategy - Structure Discriminant Function
Actual Number Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group of Cases Low Performance High Performance
Low Performance 27 22 5
81.5% 18.5%
High Performance 21 5 16
23.8% 76.2%
Total 48 27 21
Hit Ratio (Percent of cases classified correctly): 79.17%
Proportional Chance Criterion: 50.78%
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The results, therefore, provide sufficient evidence for the 
strong predictive, as well as explanatory, accuraey of the 
discriminant model constructed.
In conclusion, the research data strongly supports the 
tenets of proposition III-5. As predicted, combination of 
strategic and structural profiles of economically successful 
firms is indeed different from those of less successful 
ones. The resulting model, therefore, reinforces the idea 
that business economic performance does not have a single 
determinant. Instead, it stems from the simultaneous inter­
dependence of firms' strategic postures and appropriately 
fashioned internal structures.
C. Performance = f (Environment, Strategy, Structure);
This section is primarily concerned with proposition 
III-6 . The first, and principal, question at the heart of this 
proposition is whether high and low performance firms are 
distinguished by a combination of their environments, stra­
tegies and organization structures. A second question 
involves the pattern of environmental, strategic and struc­
tural interdependencies associated with the two performance 
levels. To address these issues, stepwise discriminant ana­
lysis was used to derive a linear combination of variables 
that best differentiates the two performance groups. The
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procedure was applied to the standardized values of items in 
all' three classes of independent variables. Using the SPSS 
program, the significance levels of the partial F-values for 
items1 entry to, and removal from, the discriminant function 
were specified at P _< 0.10. The stepwise process of item 
selection to derive the most comprehensive model is pre­
sented in Table 4-25. According to this table the final 
discriminant function includes two environmental, five stra­
tegic, and four structural items. The Chi-Square 
test of the function’s overall discriminating power is 
significant (at P _< 0.001 level). The result, therefore, 
offers support for proposition III-6 . As predicted, the 
environmental, strategic, and structural profiles of high 
performing firms are indeed different from those of low per­
forming companies. Table 4-26 depicts the manner in which 
environments, strategies, and structures of the members of 
the two performance categories are different. It shows that 
higher values on the following independent variables 
generally translate into a higher profitability level: 
firm liquidity ratio, formalization, production capacity 
utilization, production influence, and industry profitabi­
lity. That is, high performance firms tend to maintain
Table 4-25. Results of the Stepwise Discriminant Analysis




Name of Item Entered 
At Each Step








1 Firm Liquidity Ratio 0.856772 7.689877 0.0080
2 Industry Advertising Product 
Dif ferentiation
0.698842 9.696119 0.0003
3 Firm Capital Intensity 
(Assets/Sales)
0.592185 10.10036 0.0000
4 Formalization 0.519929 9.925897 0.0000
5 % Product Capacity Utilization 0.464790 9.672665 0.0000
6 Finance and Accounting Influence 0.419647 9.450175 0.0000
7 Production Influence 0.380966 9.285171 0.0000
8 Production and Operations Expansio 0.342221 9.370196 0.0000
9 Sales and Marketing Influence 0.294707 10.10462 0.0000
10 Industry Profitability 0.268638 10.07321 0.0000
11 Collection Period 
(Credit Policy)
0.247645 9.942646 0.0000
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom Significance Level
56.528 11 0.0000
Table 4-26. Standard Discriminant Function





Item Mean for Each 
Performance Group
Item Name Coefficient Low High
Firm Liquidity Ratio -0.80603 -0.33027 0.42463
Industry Advertising Product Differentiation 0.54786 0.31414 -0.40390
Firm Capital Intensity (Assets/Sales) 0.76963 0.16002 -0.20574
Formalization -0.70071 -0.27858 0.35817
% Product Capacity Utilization -0.59450 -0.14913 0.19174
Finance and Accounting Influence 0.84884 0.23356 -0.30029
Production Influence -1.00760 -0.00520 0.00669
Production and Operations Expansion 0.75903 0.09604 -0.12348
Sales and Marketing Influence 0.63250 0.16638 -0.21392
Industry Profitability -0.50699 -0.26053 0.33497
Collection Period (Credit Policy 0.37763 0.24646 -0.31687
Canonical Discriminant Function Evaluation 
at Group Means (Group Centroids) 1.50481 -1.93476
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higher levels of financial liquidity, operate at higher 
capacity levels, make more use of written rules, regulations 
and procedures, have more influential technocratic person­
nel, and belong to more profitable industries.
Additionally, Table 4-26 shows that higher values on 
another set of internal and external attributes are asso­
ciated with achievement of lower profit rates. Specifically, 
less successful companies appear to have the following 
characteristics. They are more capital intensive and place 
more emphasis on expansion of their production and opera­
tions. They have a less efficient and stringent credit 
policy. Their financial and accounting units are more 
influential in matters of strategic importance. Finally, 
they belong to more advertising intensive industries.
The above findings are, of course, very much consistent 
with the results obtained in the earlier sections of this 
chapter. More importantly, they are in agreement with other 
empirical evidence obtained from studies using similar con­
cepts. For example, Child (1974) has reported a significant 
positive relationship between firms' return on assets and 
formalization of procedures for recruiting, training, job 
definition, performance appraisal, and wage and salary 
reviews. McMillan, Hambrick, and Day (1982) have recently
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examined and confirmed Hofer's (1975) hypothesis that capa­
city utilization cignifcantly contributes to profitability of 
businesses in slow growing industries. Over capacity can 
easily result in "cut throat" measures, such as price 
rivalry, that can leave the competing parties with lower 
profitability.
Beard and Dess (1979) found a significant positive 
association between firm and industry profitability 
indices. Also, several studies using the PIMS data base 
have invariably shown an inverse relationship between firm 
capital intensity and business performance (e.g.,
Schoeffler et al., 1974; Zeithaml, 1981; McMillan et al.,
19 82). A possible explanation is that high capital inten­
sity makes the firm highly vulnerable to such adverse 
environmental trends and events as labor strikes, slower 
growth of the market, and disruptions of the inflow of raw 
materials and components. And finally, Buzzell and Farris 
(1977) provided evidence for the adverse effect of 
industry advertising intensity on companies' economic suc­
cess .
Clearly, the present study is a point of convergence for 
many studies, including those mentioned above, with regards
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to the variables under consideration.
The next step in the analysis involves assessment of the 
discriminatory power of the model developed. Table 4-27 
presents the classification matrix constructed on the basis 
of the discriminant function. Obviously the function is 
extremely reliable to the extent that it correctly classi­
fies about 9 8 percent of the sample companies into their 
proper performance groups.
Finally, to assess the predictive accuracy of the model, 
the 98 percent hit ratio is adjusted for its upward bias 
(Hair et al., 1979; klecka, 1980). The adjusted hit ratio 
produced by the BMDP "jackknifed classification" procedure 
(Jennrich and Sampson, 1979) is presented in Table 4-28.
The 93 percent adjusted hit ratio is clearly larger than 
the "Proportional Chance Criterion" of 50.78 percent* (Hair 
et al., 1979). The results, therefore, provides sufficient 
evidence for the strong predictive accuracy of the discrimi­
nant model.
In conclusion, the research data accentuates the posi­
tion that neither environment, strategy, nor structure alone
*See section I-C (page 111) of this chapter for 
description and computation of this value.
Table 4-27. Classification Matrix for the
Environment-Strategy-Structure Discriminant Function
Actual Number Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group of Cases Low Performance High Performance
Low Performance 27 27 0
1 0 0 .0 % 0 .0%
High Performance 21 1 20
4.8% 95.2%
Total 48 28 20
Hit Ratio (Percent of cases correctly classified): 97.92%
Table 4-28. Jackknifed Classification for the
Environment-Strategy-Structure Discriminant Function
Actual Number Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group of Cases Low Performance High Performance
Low Performance 27 26 1
96.3% 3.7%
High Performance 21 2 19
90.5% 9.5%
Total 48 28 20
Hit Ratio (Percent of cases correctly classified): 93.80%
Proportional Chance Criterion: 50.78%
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account for difference in levels of business performance. 
Rather, as some have posited, the key to profitability lies 
in a complex network of interrelated elements (Preston,
1977; Thorelli, 1977; Caves, 1980; Lenz, 1980 a and b; White 
and Hammermesh, 19 81). The data also challenges the 
appropriateness of research which employs some subset of the 
variables (i.e., environment, strategy, or structure) to 
account for organizational performance. The fields of 
industrial organizations, organization theory, and business 
policy have for too long taken separate and independent 
approaches to studying business organizations. The concep­
tual framework of each, therefore, has taken into account 
only a subset of the antecedents of organization perfor­
mance. As such, their models often offer incomplete and 
less than adequate representations of the complex organiz- 
tional realities. Interdisciplinary works aimed at cross­
fertilization and widening of boundaries across these 
research traditions (i.e., 10, OT, and BP) may provide the 
stepping stones for moving them beyond the deficiencies of 
their existing models.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The question of what determines organizational per­
formance is of common interest to students of economics, 
organization theory and business policy. An overview of the 
directions of research in these three fields indicated that 
while these areas have overlapping and sometimes similar 
explanatory variables, they have adopted rather independent 
approaches to studying of organizational performance. These 
approaches have often encouraged a certain fragmentation in 
the resulting theories that makes it difficult to detect the 
cumulative implications of research findings of these 
various disciplines. It was, therefore, suggested that 
industrial organization economics, organization theory, and 
business policy have gone their separate ways for too long. 
There is clearly a need and considerable opportunity for 
cross-fertilization across these disciplinary areas. They 
have a great deal in common and should be exchanging 
theoretical frameworks and expanding their research 
boundaries. The study presented in this dissertation is 
indeed an attempt in that direction. It presented and 
empirically tested an interdisciplinary model of firms'
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economic performance. The major feature of the integrative 
model of this study is that it views, in a single framework, 
performance as a function of the interaction of the competi­
tive environment, business strategy, and organization 
structure. Furthermore, the study incorporates the 10 
concept of industry structure into management's strategy- 
structures-performance paradigm, recognizing that industry 
is the fundamental arena which circumscribes the behavior of 
business organizations. That is, there are distinguishing 
characteristics of industries that affect the type of 
external issues or problems salient to top management and 
the strategic and operational responses chosen to deal with 
them.
To designate the sample for this study, a list of 162 
manufacturing companies with operations in one or at most 
two 4-aigit SIC categories were selected from the Standard 
and Poor's COMPUSTAT tapes. From this list, 48 companies 
agreed to participate in the study and supplied the neces­
sary information. Secondary published sources, question­
naires filled out by the chief operating officers of the 
companies, and the S&P COMPUSTAT tapes were the primary 
sources of data for the research. Multivariate statistical 
techniques (such as factor analysis, cluster analysis, 
stepwise discriminant analysis) and correlation matrices 
were used to prepare and analyze the data.
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As predicted, it was discovered that there are indeed 
industry differences in types of challenges and uncertain­
ties confronting top management. For instance, evidence 
seemed to support the argument that while high industry 
advertising outlays are instrumental to product differenti­
ation, they may also reflect presence of fierce rivalry for 
market share among the competitors. As a result, competi­
tion in the industry may resemble a zero-sum game, where 
advertising dollars are aggressively spent to gain larger 
market share at the cost of competitors.
It was also found that as the structural dimensions of 
an industry approach characteristics of oligopolies, the 
dominant mode of rivalry in the industry is likely to become 
non-price related in general, and of marketing and promo­
tional form in particular. Finally, some theoretical 
arguments suggest that firms in faster growing industries 
are less likely to feel competitive pressures than those in 
slow-growth or stagnating markets (Porter, 1980; 
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, 1974) . The present research, however, 
showed the opposite. As Caves (1972) suggests, although 
potentially more profitable, faster growing industries are 
sites of more intense rivalry.
The present research also concluded that the strategic 
responses that different environmental challenges elicit are 
quite different and vary by industry characteristics. For
example, when the industry is characterized by higher 
product differentiation, companies operating in it are 
likely to pursue expansion of their market by monitoring 
customer needs and tastes, enhancing the image of their 
product brands and spending more on advertising. Such 
measures are apparently aimed at increasing customers' 
awareness of the products and creating and maintaining 
customer preference and loyalty for the product brands. On 
the other hand, when competition is perceived to be cut­
throat and price related, firms tend to adopt risk aversive 
measures such as proliferation of a wider range of products, 
monitoring competitors' actions, and placing more weight on 
competitive pricing component of their strategic package. 
Faced with such competitive challenges, it is also not 
surprising that companies perceive promotional activities as 
costly and unnecessary luxuries. Instead, they tend to 
emphasize measures that allow them to capitalize on cost 
advantages that stem from economics of scale, while down 
playing expensive moves (such as plant and equipment mod­
ernization) that may drain the funds and adversely affect 
their short-term profit picture.
It is also shown by the data that rapid market growth 
is likely to induce firms to practice price cutting as an 
attractive strategy that might improve their competitive 
position and can ultimately lead to greater future profits.
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Furthermore, companies in such markets are more R & D inten­
sive and emphasize modernization and expansion strategies to 
keep up with the diverse and growing needs and demands of 
their markets.
The data also seems to indicate that environments 
characterized by more intense rivalry or/and more techno­
logical dynamism require companies to stress a more diverse 
set of strategic options. Apparently, rivalry and techno­
logical change imply uncertainty, dynamism, and complexity. 
And to the extent that dynamic and complex environments are 
richer in contingencies, they would appear to raise the 
importance of a larger number of strategic type activities 
(Khandwalla, 1976).
The research also contended and confirmed that differ­
ent competitive environments and various strategies beget 
different organizational responses in terms of their 
internal structural attributes. The data indicated, for 
instance, that the degree of organizational decentralization 
is greater in more oligopolistic industries. It was argued 
that this could well be a reaction to the simultaneous 
presence of both uncertainty and dependence in such environ­
ments (Aldrich, 1978). As predicted, it was also found that 
power of organizational units is fundamentally determined by 
the importance of the units' tasks in dealing with the major 
environmental and strategic contingencies facing the
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organization. This is so because first, such activities 
facilitate the rationalization of organizational activities 
while at the same time keeping organizations adaptive to 
their external constraints (Thompson, 1967; Galbraith,
1973). Secondly, because strategic decisions take on 
meanings only as they are implemented through organization's 
structure and processes. In short, the prevalent positions 
with regards to the interdependencies of environment and 
structure as well as strategy and structure were reaffirmed 
by the results.
Last but not least, the research delved into the 
practical implication of the external and internal charac­
teristics of the businesses with respect to their economic 
performance. The findings with regards to such relation­
ships were strikingly consistent throughout. Of the envi­
ronmental variables, while industry advertising intensity 
and price competition were among the most detrimental, 
industry average profitability and market growth were the 
most conducive to profitability. Apparently what Aldrich 
(1979) calls "environmental capacity" and Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) refer to as environmental "munificence" is 
in fact an important dimension of organizational environment 
and its presence does facilitate survival of business 
organizations.
Of the internal properties of the sample companies, a 
few consistently stand out as major contributors to
financial success. Production capacity utilization is one 
of those. Obviously more efficient use of the facilities 
and equipment results in lower fixed cost per unit of the 
products. The impact of this variable is likely to be more 
dramatic in stagnant and declining markets as well as in 
capital intensive industries where greater utilization of 
the capacity gives companies a significant competitive edge 
over the rivals. In line with the foregoing finding and 
discussion is also the negative impact of capital intensity 
on profitability. As a barrier to entry and a deterrent to 
the new competition/ high capital intensity was expected to 
be positively related to performance. However, as a source 
of vulnerability in hostile environments plagued with such 
temporary or long lasting trends and incidents as labor 
strikes, material shortages, and declining demands, capital 
intensity should have an adverse effect on performance. 
According to this and other studies (e.g., Schoeffler et 
al., 1974; Zeithaml et al., 1981), of the two scenarios just 
presented, the latter supercedes the impact of the former.
Another internal variable found to be strongly related 
to performance level was firm's financial liquidity. It is 
plausible to argue that since liquidity is a requirement for 
short-term survival of business enterprises, it must there­
fore be a prerequisite to their long-term success also.
Such explanations with respect to this relationship, how­
ever, are very speculative. It might be just as plausible
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to contend that higher liquidity is the effect, rather than 
cause of higher profitability. That is, relative abundance 
of slack resources allows more profitable firms to maintain 
a greatest portion of their assets in liquid forms. Resolu­
tion of this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation 
and calls for longitudinal studies to deal with it.
Another significant result of this research was also 
that top management's power structure, as well as the organ­
izational use of impersonal bureaucratic controls emerged as 
powerful discriminants between low- and high-performance 
groups of companies. The more technocratically oriented 
units seem to portray a greater degree of influence on 
matters of strategic importance in more successful compan­
ies. This might be because the sample for this study was 
strictly composed of manufacturing companies. And effective 
development, design, and production of products might in 
general be of the most crucial aspects of the operations in 
manufacturing industries.
An equally interesting finding was that financially 
oriented subunits consistently showed more say in the 
strategic decisions of the low-performing group. This does 
not necessarily imply that pervasive influence of such units 
causes more marginal performance. An alternative explana­
tion is that subsequent to their weak performance, these 
companies become dominated by financially oriented execu­
tives who will be in charge of turning them around.
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Longitudinal research designs are recommended for future 
research to clarify the question of causality with respect 
to the relationships of many of our research variables, 
including the foregoing two.
Among the groups of variables that need such clarifica­
tions, the following stand out. As discussed in the earlier 
sections, the challenges presented to the organizations by 
their competitive environments elicit certain strategic 
responses. However, the strategic options adopted by the 
companies also tend to change the structure of their compet­
itive environment. For example, mergers and acquisitions on 
the part of companies tend to increase concentration in the 
industry. Longitudinal designs are needed to account for 
such feedback loops if existing conceptual frameworks are to 
be enriched.
Incorporating theories and concepts from other disci­
plines such as marketing into our research model is also 
recommended for future research. Recall that this research 
did not include concepts such as market share that is held 
by some marketing literature to be of major significance in 
explaining business profitability (Schoeffler et al., 1974).
This research reaffirmed the position that the environ­
mental, strategic, and structural profile of high- and 
low-performing firms are different, and described what sets 
the two groups apart. The small research sample, the design
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of the study and the limited scope of the dissertation, 
however, did not allow us to examine the specific nature of 
the "goodness of fit" between environment and strategy (or 
structure), as implied in th OT and BP literature. That is, 
this dissertation did not delve into the question of exactly 
what strategies or structures should be adopted under any 
specific set of environmental conditions. Future research 
is recommended to address such questions.
Business Policy and Organization Theory have only 
recently tapped the extensive literature of Industrial 
Organizational Economics. Much, however, remains to be done 
to create and expand rigorous integrative conceptual and 
empirical frameworks that encompass such relevant economic 
concepts as barriers to exit, threat of substitute products, 
power of supplier groups, power of customer groups, and so 
forth (Porter, 1980).
The list of the variables used in this project for 
development of multivariate models of firm economic perfor­
mance is by no means exhaustive. Important factors such as 
competitive position, top management compensation, and 
organizational climate were overlooked because of small 
sample size and in the interest of the depth, as opposed to 
the scope, of the analysis. Attempts to incorporate such 
concepts into our future research models will be steps in 
the right direction.
Finally, firm performance and effectiveness are multi­
dimensional concepts, of which profitability represents only 
one aspect. Further research is needed to investigate the 
possible implications of companies' environmental, strate­
gic, and structural profiles for other dimensions of their 
performance including company growth, employee morale, 
adaptability, social responsiveness, and so forth.
In short, it appears that the study of organizations 
and their performance is striving toward the sort of synthe­
sis presented here. The primary contribution of this 
research, despite its limitations, was to help us ride with 
and hopefully accelerate this trend.
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Please take a few minutes to consider an offer you may 
not wish to refuse.
A research project is being conducted through the 
Louisiana State University Management Department that is 
designed to gather and analyze information concerning the 
competitive nature of manufacturing industries and firms' 
strategic responses that lead to higher performance and 
profitability.
If you will thoughtfully fill out the enclosed 
confidental questionnaire (the data will only be used in 
aggregate form) we will, in return, provide you with an 
executive summary of our research analysis and conclusions. 
We hope you will find the questionnaire thought provoking 
and the executive summary interesting and useful in your 
planning efforts.
Thank you for your time and we look forward to your 
participation in the study.
Sincerely,









We hope you recall receiving a letter from us along 
with a copy of our Top Management Questionnaire several 
weeks ago. Although participation in the study has been 
good so far, we still need more responses to be able to 
perform a meaningful and objective analysis of the data. If 
you have not yet returned the completed questionnaire, we 
strongly urge you to do so. Your participation is crucial 
to this study and is highly valued. A second copy of the 
questionniare is enclosed, just in case the first one has 
been misplaced. If you have, however, already sent your 
response, please disregard this letter and accept our 
gratitude.
We would like to reiterate that your response will be 
held strictly confidential and that we will mail you an 
executive summary of the research findings which, we are 
confident, you will find valuable in your planning efforts.
Thank you for your time and we appreciate your 
participation in the study.
Sincerely,









Copyrighted materials in this document 
have not been filmed at the request of 
the author. They are available for 
consultation, however, in the author's 
university library.
These consist of pages:
188-190 : Perceived Competitive Pressures
191-193 : Competitive Weapons Questionnaire
194-195 : Autonomy and Decentra l izat ion
196-197 : Delegation o f  Authority
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Interdepartmental Strategic Influence
Please rate the degree of influence that each of the 
following departments (or units) exerts in your company with 





Sales and Marketing Units 1 2  3 4 5
Production Unit 1 2  3 4 5
Engineering Unit 1 2  3 4 5
Research and Development Unit 1 2  3 4 5
Finance and Accounting Units 1 2  3 4 5
APPENDIX C
SELECTED DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON RESEARCH VARIABLES
STANDARD MINIMUM MAXIMUM
VARIABLE LABEL: N MEAN DEVIATION VALUE VALUE
OBJECTIVE STRATEGY:
R&D/S 32 3.10750 3.08851 0. 00000 10.59000
ADV/S 32 3.05031 3.62420 0.10000 17. 15000
C.AS/C.LI 48 2.86649 1 .38320 0.91000 9.60000
ASS/S 48 74.16896 23.17490 38. 18000 162.88000
COLLECTION PERIOD 48 70.34729 26.62221 8.54000 139.36000
PLANT MODERNIZATION 48 57.88979 13.01192 36. 10000 90.23000
% CAPACITY UTILIZATION 48 72.10417 15.10282 30.00000 100.00000
PERCEIVED STRATEGY:
FIN LIQUIDITY 47 3.68085 1 .16295 1 .00000 5.00000
NEW FUNDS 47 3.02128 1.05273 1.00000 5.00000
ADV. FREQ. 47 2.91489 0.97423 1 .00000 5.00000
ADV QUALITY 47 3.57447 0.97233 1.00000 5.00000
COST REDUCTION 47 4.12766 0.87519 2.00000 5.00000
EMPL EFFICIENCY 47 4.19149 0.68010 3.00000 5.00000
LOW PRICE 47 3.02128 0.96660 1.00000 5.00000
HI PRICE 47 2.95745 1 .02060 1 .00000 5.00000
BRAND IMAGE 47 3.97872 1 .17009 1 .00000 5.00000
PROD QLTY 47 4.72340 0.45215 4.00000 5.00000
PRDCT WARRANTY 47 3.27660 1.11710 1 .00000 5.00000
CUSTOMER CREDIT 47 3.36170 1.13109 1.00000 5.00000
CUST SERVICE 47 4.46809 0.71782 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 5.00000
WIDE PROD RANGE 47 3.21277 1.04124 1.00000 5.00000
NARROW PROD RANGE 47 2.57447 1.13721 1 .00000 5.00000
NEW PROD DEV 47 4.06383 0.89453 1.00000 5.00000
PROD IMPROVEMENT 47 3.63830 0.84508 1 .00000 5.00000
BCKWRD INTEGRATION 47 1.95745 1 .12206 1.00000 5.00000
FRWRD INTEGRATION 47 2.76596 1.27199 1 .00000 5.00000
PREDICTING CUST TASTE 47 3.63830 1 .07188 1.00000 5.00000
PRED COPT ACTION 47 3.46809 1 .03946 1 .00000 5.00000
IMPROVE PROCESS TECH 47 3.59574 0.82514 1.00000 5.00000
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STANDARD MINIMUM MAXIMUM
N MEAN DEVIATION VALUE VALUE
INCREASE CAPACITY USE 47 3.72340 0.97138 1 .00000 5.00000
EXPAND CAPACITY 47 3.04255 0.85865 1.00000 4.00000
INCREASE MKT SHRE 47 4.12766 0.74065 2.00000 5.00000
MERGERS 47 2.70213 1.19628 1.00000 5.00000
STRATEGIC COMPLEXITY 47 6.51064 3.64079 0.00000 15.00000
INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS:
INDUSTRY ROA 48 11 .05104 2.29561 6.83000 16.30000
4-CONCENTRATION 48 32. 10417 17.69270 4.00000 72.00000
8-CONCENTRATION 48 45.70833 18.67067 10.00000 86.0 0 0 0 0
SCALE ECONOMIES 48 6.10792 4.99560 0 . 10000 17.98000
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 48 163.40542 308.94087 6.25000 1887.00000
PROD DIFFERENTIATIONS 48 2.33750 2.19144 0.40000 10.20000
% INDUSTRY GROWTH 48 36.33271 21 .92582 -20.31000 73.89000
PERCEIVED COMPETIVE PRESSURES:
PERCEIVED INTENSITY OF RIVALRY 48 28.52458 4.45870 15.42000 39.44000
PROMOTIONAL COMPETITION 48 3.75958 1 .42422 1 .41000 7.00000
SELLING AND DIST COMPETITION 48 5.21333 1.19839 2.45000 7.00000
QLTY 7 VERTY COMPETITION 48 5.16646 1 . 15666 1.00000 7.00000
PRICE COMPETITION 48 5.04229 1.30163 1 .00000 7.00000
RATE OF PROD INNOVATION 48 4.93042 1 .48112 1.00000 7.00000
RATE OF PROCESS INNOVATION 48 4.41187 1 .29593 1.00000 7.00000
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE:
SALES & MKTG INFLUENCE 48 4.37500 0.63998 3.00000 5.00000
PRODUCTION INFLUENCE 48 3.37500 0.89025 1 .00000 5.00000
ENGINEERING INFLUENCE 48 3.18750 1.21439 1 .00000 5.00000
R&D INFLUENCE 48 3.45833 1.07106 1.00000 5.00000
FIN & ACCTG INFLUENCE 48 3.35417 1.02084 1.00000 5.00000
CEO DELEGATION 48 27. 10417 6.29502 16.00000 50.00000
AUTONOMY 48 20.66667 2.86084 9.00000 23.00000
FORMALIZATION 48 11.83333 3.25729 3.00000 18.00000
CEO SPAN 48 6.37500 2.96522 1.00000 15.00000
DECENTRALIZATION 48 38.85417 11 .02606 9.00000 63.00000
DECENT OF OPERATIVE DECISIONS 
DECENT OF MKTG DECISIONS 
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LIST OF INDUSTRIES REPRESENTED IN THE TARGET AND RESEARCH SAMPLES
No. of companies No. of companies 
in the in the
SIC TITLE target sample research sample
Beet Sugar 1 0
Candy & Other Confectionery Products 2 0
Matt Beverages 1 1
Cigars 1 0
Warp Knit Fabric Mills 1 0
Tufted Carpets and Rugs 4 3
Yarn Texturizing, Twisting and Winding Mills 2 1
Women's, Misses' & Juniors' Outwear, N.E.C. 1 0
Mobile Homes 5 0
Wood Household Furniture, except Upholstered 1 0
Mattresses and Bedsprings 1 0
Metal Office Furniture 1 1
Paper Mills, except Building Paper Mills 1 1
Converted Paper and Paperboard products, N.E.C. 1 1
Periodicals: Publishing, Publishing & Printing 1 0
Books: Publishing, Publishing & Printing 5 2
Commercial Printing, lithographic 1 1
Manifold Business Forms 1 1
Pharmaceutical preparations 5 0
Perfumes, Cosmetic and other toilet preparations 5 2
Industrial organic chemicals, N.E.C. 1 0
Adhesives and Sealants 1 0
Petroleum refining 1 0
Lubricating oils and greases 1 1
Fabricated rubber products, N.E.C. 1 1
Miscellaneous plastics products 7 1
Women's footwear, except athletic 1 0
Glass containers 1 0





























LIST OF INDUSTRIES REPRESENTED IN THE TARGET AND RESEARCH SAMPLES
No. of companies No. of companies 
in the in the
SIC TITLE tarqet sample research
Asbestos products 1 0
Blast furnaces, steelworks, and rolling mills 3 0
Steel pipe and tubes 1 0
Rolling, drawing, and extruding of nonferrous metals 1 1
Nonferrous foundaries (casting), N.E.C. 1 0
Fabricated plat work (boiler shops) 1 1
Miscellaneous metal work 1 0
Bolts, nuts, screws, rivets, and washers 2 0
Valves and pipe fittings 2 0
Fabricated metal products, N.E.C. 2 0
Oil field machinery and equipment 1 1
Special Industry machinery, N.E.C. 2 2
Pumps and pumping equipment 1 1
Electronic computing equipment 17 6
Office machines, N.E.C. 1 0
Service industry machines, N.E.C. 1 0
Industrial controls 1 0
Sewing machines 1 0
Electric lamps 2 0
Radio and TV receiving sets 5 3
Telephone & telegraph apparatus 3 0
Radio & TV transmitting equipment 15 5
Semiconductors and related devices 1 0
Electronic capacitors 1 1
Electronic components, N.E.C. 8 2
Electrical machinery, equipment & supplies 1 0
Motor Vehicle parts & accessories 4 ■ 1
Aircraft 1 0
Aircraft parts & auxiliary equipment, N.E.C. 1 0
LIST OF INDUSTRIES REPRESENTED IN THE TARGET AND RESEARCH SAMPLES
SIC CODE 
3 7 3 1  
3 8 1 1  
3 8 2 3
3 8 2 5  
3 8 2 9  
3 8 4 1  
3 8 6 1  
3 9 1 1  
3 9 3 1  
3 9 5 1
SIC TITLE
Shipbuilding and repairing 
Engineering, scientific & research instruments 
Industrial instruments for measurement display and 
control of process variables & related products 
Instruments for measuring & testing of electricity 
Measuring & controlling devices, N.E.C.
Surgical & medical instruments and apparatus 
Photographic equipment and supplies 
Jewelry, precious metal 
Musical instruments
Pens, mechanical pencils, and parts __
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